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Prior to May 1980, the French domestic law on arbitration"
had not been subject to any substantial legislative reform since the
early nineteenth century. The procedural part of that law, which
contained practically all of the French legislative provisions apply-
ing to arbitration, was out of date and in need of reconsideration.
Despite the considerable French procedural law reforms enacted in
1975,2 articles 1005 through 1028 of the Nouveau Code de procg-
dure civile had not been revised to any significant extent since the
enactment of the Code de procedure civile in 1806. 8
A. The Antecedent Legislation
The French legal system had been living with provisions on
domestic arbitration which, per force, contained gaps 4 and did not
respond to many of the fundamental doctrinal issues that had sur-
faced in arbitral practice and court litigatiort dealing with arbitra-
tion since 1806.1 Despite the absence of modern legislation, con-
temporary French courts exhibited a remarkably receptive attitude
towards arbitration, and recourse to arbitration was frequent in
1. See, e.g., Level, Compromis d'arbitrage [1976] JURIS-CLASSEUR CIVIL [J.C.C.] 2.
2. See Decree No. 75-1123 of December 5, 1975 [1975] Journal Officiel [J.O.] 12521. See
also E. BLANC, LA NOUVELLE PROCEDURE CIVILE (1973); C. PARODI, L'ESPRIT GENERAL ET LES
INNOVATIONS DU NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE (1976); Bandrac, Indications som-
maires sur les principales modifications dans les regles ant~rieures introduites par le
d6cret du 5 d~c. 1975 instituant un Noveau Code de procedure civile [1976] Juris-classeur
p~riodique, la semaine juridique [J.C.P.] II No. 2799; Bertin, Le grand Noel du prockdurier:
le Nouveau Code de procedure civile [1976] 1 & 2 GAz. PALMS Doctrine 55, 115, 153, 225,
313, 350, 424, & 581; Blin, Le Noveau Code de procedure civile ou l'expropriation du justi-
ciable [1976], 1 GAZ. PALMS Doctrine 212.
3. See, e.g., Level, supra note 1, at 2.
4. The flexibility and moderation of the applicable legislation was evident in the fact
that the relevant codal provisions were neither numerous nor exceedingly detailed in sub-
stance and covered only the most salient issues or ones which could arise in exceptional
circumstances. These characteristics of the procedural law on arbitration reflected a legisla-
tive policy of giving arbitration the "breathing room" it needed in order to function prop-
erly. See Nou. C. PR. CiV. (Fr.), bk. 3, Des arbitrages (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
5. For example, although the French courts rendered a number of rulings on this ques-
tion, there was no codal provision relating to the extent and scope of the arbitrators' juris-
diction. In fact, there was disagreement on this question between the French Supreme Court
for private law matters (Cour de cassation) and a number of courts of appeal (cours
d'appel), in particular the Paris Cour d'appel. There was, therefore, a need for a legislative
text which resolved the controversy in the jurisprudence and which provided for a settled
position in this area. For a discussion of this point, see J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU,
L'ARBITRAGE H10 (1st ed. 1971) (and sources cited).
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commercial practice.6 As a consequence, a sophisticated body of
French case law and scholarly commentary pertained to the prac-
tice of arbitration and there arose a need for legislation on arbitra-
tion which would correspond to these developments.
Although flexible, the previous legislation simply did not pro-
vide sufficient guidance on arbitral matters.' For over twenty
years, French legal scholars and practitioners advocated reform,9
especially of the means of recourse which could be invoked to chal-
lenge awards. 10 Under the now-repealed articles 1023 through 1028
of the Nouveau Code de procedure civile, court created rules and
other procedural provisions, the means of recourse were numer-
ous-sometimes duplicative-and resulted in the application of a
fairly intricate legal procedure.11 At times, the complexity of this
process must have dissuaded both French and foreign parties from
resorting to arbitration (at least, under French procedural law)
and/or must have suited the ends of a party who, in bad faith,
intended to undermine the initial recourse to arbitration through
dilatory tactics.
B. The New Legislation
The long-awaited legislative reform of the French domestic
procedural law on arbitration has been enacted in the form of the
Decree of May 14, 1980.12 The Decree repeals articles 1005 through
1028 of the Nouveau Code de procedure civile s and replaces them
6. See, e.g., Level, supra note 1, at 2.
7. See, e.g., J. ROBERT, ARBITRAGE CIVIL ET COMMERCIAL (4th ed. 1967); J. RUBELLIN-
DEVICHI, L'ARBITRAGE NATURE JURIDIQUE DROIT INTERNE ET DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (1965).
8. For example, to inform adequately French nationals or foreign parties who were con-
templating arbitration under French procedural rules. The procedural consequences of their
intention to arbitrate under French law were only barely outlined in the legislation. An
informed choice could be made only by consulting arbitration specialists or engaging blindly
in the process and learning from that experience. Neither solution was acceptable from a
practical standpoint.
9. Robert, La legislation nouvelle sur l'arbitrage [1980], Dalloz-Sirey, Chronique No.
25, 189 (hereinafter cited as Robert, Decree Commentary).
10. See Level, supra note 1, at 2.
11. See, e.g., P. HERzOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 530 (1967).
12. Decree No. 80-354 of May 14, 1980 [1980] J.O. 1238 (hereinafter cited as Decree).
See also Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 207. For a French language analysis of the De-
cree provisions by an eminent French arbitration expert, see Robert, Decree Commentary,
supra note 9. See also Riotte, La rforme de l'arbitrage, 78 LES PETITEs APFICHES 6 (1980)
(hereinafter cited as Riotte, Decree Commentary). See generally 13 BULL. RAP. DR. AFF. 2-4
(1980).
13. Decree, supra note 12, art. 1, at 1238.
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with some fifty new provisions which took effect on October 1,
1980.14 The provisions of the Decree, of course, leave intact the
other domestic legal provisions relating to arbitration.
The Decree responds to a number of critical questions left un-
answered by the former legislation, most notably, the extent and
scope of arbitral jurisdiction and the role of court intervention in
arbitral proceedings. The Decree also implicitly confers a new legal
status upon the compromissory clause and reorganizes the means
of recourse that can be invoked against arbitral awards. Although
it is not the purveyor of extreme or radical change, the Decree gen-
erally does contain some fundamental alterations of the French
legislative conception of arbitration.
The Decree restructures the body of applicable law, which was
disparate and loosely organized, into a more coherent and intelligi-
ble whole. Its substantive provisions are presented in a well-articu-
lated, logical progression under clear subject headings which follow
the actual stages of the arbitral process and address most of the
key issues that are likely to arise at each stage of the process. As a
balanced legislative procedural guide to French domestic arbitra-
tion, the Decree avoids the twin risks of neglecting to address fun-
damental questions and prescribing overly detailed rules on these
and other questions. It achieves a pragmatic compromise between
the need for malleable legal prescriptions and the requirement that
legislation be well-organized and comprehensive.
As the French commentators have asserted,15 the basic inten-
tion of the new legislative text is unmistakable: it is designed to
promote arbitration as an institution for dispute resolution. In
fact, the Decree appears to be the offspring of recommendations of
practitioners and academic lawyers who were aware of the deficien-
cies of the previous legislative rules and who had an accurate per-
ception of what needed to be done. The new legislation benefits
considerably from this input. For example, it maintains the
desirable flexibility of the former legislation, and at the same time,
resolves longstanding doctrinal controversies between the courts
and scholars. As a general rule, it remedies many of the uncertain-
ties that attended the application or interpretation of the previous
legislation. More specifically, it contains an entirely new section on
the rules relating to the form and content of the compromissory
14. Id. art. 52, at 1240.
15. Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 7.
No. 2]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
clause; it defines and delimits the circumstances in which the
courts can intervene in arbitral proceedings; it confers new proce-
dural authority upon arbitrators, especially in regard to their au-
thority to rule upon jurisdictional challenges; it aligns the arbitral
proceeding with court actions, thereby clarifying basic procedural
questions; it eliminates the need for provisions relating to the
nomination of a tiers arbitre by providing that arbitral tribunals
will be composed of an uneven number of arbitrators; and finally,
it expands the treatment applying to the exequatur (enforcement
order) granted to arbitral awards, establishing, in particular, that
awards have res judicata effect once they have been rendered.
C. Purpose of This Study
This article analyzes the new provisions on French domestic
arbitration in the order in which they appear in the Decree. In do-
ing so, it compares the new prescriptions with their counterparts or
the lack thereof in the antecedent legislation and attempts to point
to the underlying rationale of the new provisions and their prob-
able impact upon French arbitral practice. The commentary out-
lines in an initial section some of the policy considerations which
might have led to the enactment of the Decree and its substance.
Although the principal focus of the analysis relates to the substan-
tive character and implications of the provisions for French arbi-
tral practice, the probable underlying motivation for the new legis-
lation will punctuate the technical assessment of the provisions.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF A COMMON POLICY
PERSPECTIVE: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL FRENCH ARBITRAL LAW
COMPARED
The new domestic legislation contrasts with the decisional law
that applies in matters of international arbitration. The jurispru-
dence that governs international arbitral cases has been moulded
to the special needs of that area of litigation. The French courts
have rendered some of the domestic provisions inapplicable in the
international context e.g., the requirement of a reasoned opinion,
the time limit rule, and most of the means of recourse, provisions
which respond primarily to internal needs. The enactment of the
Decree does not modify this doctrine. Nevertheless the retention of
rules in the domestic legislation which are deemed inappropriate
[Vol. 4
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for application in the international context does not mean that the
French domestic attitude toward arbitration is less progressive or
enlightened than its international counterpart. Despite certain
substantive differences, the Decree is no less liberal in regard to
arbitration than the court-articulated rules in the international
area. Indeed, the domestic legislation is imbued with a single and
similar policy motivation: to strengthen the institutional position
of arbitration, recognizing its status as a legitimate and accepted
means of resolving disputes. On this score, there is absolutely no
distinction to be drawn between the domestic legislation and the
judicial doctrine in the international area.
A. Unresolved Jurisdictional Issues
On some critical issues which have been resolved in the inter-
national arena in a way that supports the institution of arbitration,
the new domestic legislation appears to be somewhat hesitant-or
at least not as explicit. On the problem of jurisdiction, for example,
it is not clear whether the Decree incorporates the separability
doctrine into the French domestic law on arbitration. The doctrine
is part of the French jurisprudence applying to international arbi-
tral litigation and the juridical autonomy it attributes to the com-
promissory clause is the centerpiece of that court-created doctrine.
The Decree has unquestionably made progress on the jurisdictional
issue and may well provide for the separability doctrine. Its exact
import on this question is a matter of interpretation. The French
commentators argue without any reservations, however, that the
separability doctrine is now part of internal French law, and the
courts may well follow their construction.
B. The Achievements of the Decree in Terms of a Policy Per-
spective on Arbitration
The unstated but clear presumption (i.e., that arbitration is a
legitimate dispute resolution process and should be upheld) which
characterizes the jurisprudence in the international area was also
reflected in the French domestic courts' treatment of arbitration
cases under the antecedent legislation. The Decree essentially codi-
fies this favorable judicial attitude, one fostered in part by a so-
phisticated and progressively-minded French arbitration bar of
practitioners and scholars. It elaborates rules which reflect the ad-
vances made by the decisional law and approved by scholarly com-
No. 21
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mentators. The old judicial hostility toward arbitration which orig-
inally created a hiatus between the domestic and international
arenas is no more than a remnant of a distant and forgotten past.
The Decree, in effect, confirms the contemporary judicial position
that arbitration is a viable and legitimate institution in both the
domestic and international arenas.
While the new legislation retains the flexibility of the old, it
strongly evidences a reformulated view of arbitration. The control-
ling regulations are built upon and mirror the realities of the arbi-
tral process and seek to further its implementation and successful
completion. Gaps are filled and the former rules are reconsidered
and reorganized into a more coherent body of law that reflects the
developments achieved in more than one hundred and ,seventy
years of litigation. The Decree, however, adds a number of critical
ideas that transcend even the uncodified holdings of the courts. As
a whole, the new legislative rules point to a definition of the char-
acter of this private dispute resolution process, and from that defi-
nition, elaborate a view of how arbitration should coexist with the
publicly authorized tribunals. Moreover, the Decree acknowledges
the contractual nature of the arbitral process, emphasizing the im-
portance of the parties' autonomy of will in establishing regula-
tions for the process. More importantly, however, it equates arbi-
tral proceedings to their judicial analogues as much as possible,
attributing increased authority to the arbitrators and a stronger
jurisdictional status to their awards.
C. The Fundamental Contribution
The originality of the Decree lies here. The crucial aspect of
any legislation relating to arbitration centers around the relation-
ship it establishes between the arbitral .and judicial processes. De-
spite the complete absence of former legislation and a paucity of
judicial rulings on this question, the Decree addresses the auton-
omy issue squarely and unequivocally. Under the new French law,
the courts are perceived as a complement to the arbitral process,
providing the public force of law to a private contractual process in
those circumstances in which such intervention is necessary to the
successful implementation of the process. The judiciary also can
review arbitral awards to determine their conformity to basic tech-
nical requirements and strong public policy concerns, but this type
of limited scrutiny, exercised by courts which are already favorably
disposed to arbitration, can only add a greater sense of legitimacy
[Vol. 4
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to the arbitral process. Thus, these new provisions attest to the
advance character of French arbitration law and could make the
Decree a model for the laws of other jurisdictions.
D. La Raison D'Etre
The question remains as to why France has such a progres-
sively minded domestic law on arbitration. Clearly, the liberal
character of the jurisprudence in the international area must have
had an impact. There must have been a desire to articulate a na-
tional policy which was consistent with the rules applying interna-
tionally. This explanation provides a good orientation, but it falls
short of a complete answer. Although these remarks are specula-
tive, it seems that the French attitude toward arbitration, both do-
mestic and international, is the product of a set of historical fac-
tors which acted in conjunction with pragmatic decision-making
on the part of the judiciary, the type of decision-making which was
fostered by the arbitration bar.
In the early twentieth century, the growth of arbitration in the
international commercial sector and the recognition of France as a
situs for holding such arbitrations led to a modification of internal
French law, thereby ridding it of some of its nineteenth century
judicial bias against arbitration. Crowded dockets, the highly tech-
nical character of disputes, and the popularity of arbitration in do-
mestic commercial practice must have also had a significant impact
upon the French judiciary's perception of the arbitral process. In
an age of increasing commercial litigation involving complex fac-
tual determinations, the courts were Aot prone to view arbitral
tribunals as incompetent competitors, but rather (much like the
specialized lay commercial tribunals) as parallel institutions, ad-
mittedly of inferior public rank, which provided a much needed
degree of expertise and relief. The judicial and hence legislative
about face, however, would not have come about so quickly or so
affirmatively had it not been for the persistent activity of a special-
ized group of professionals dedicated to the study of arbitration
and to the objective of having French law adapt as realistically as
possible to the arbitral process. This reasoning is, of course, en-
tirely conjectural, but it seems that the late twentieth century
French legislative and judicial attitude toward arbitration, either
international or domestic, would not have achieved its current so-
phistication or liberal tenor had it not been for the work of the
arbitration bar. This bar consists of both academic jurists and
No. 2]
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practitioners who have performed an indispensable pedagogical
role, advising both the courts and the legislature on the present-
day importance of arbitration and the realities of the arbitral pro-
cess. The liberal French attitude toward arbitration and the re-
markable substance of the Decree of May 14, 1980, should be at-
tributed in large measure to the continuing efforts of this group.
This set of factors helps to explain the reasons for the modifica-
tions and changes that were introduced by the Decree and which
are discussed below.
III. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A. The Submission and the Compromissory Clause: The Old
Regime
Under the repealed legislation, the rules relating to the form
and content, i.e., to the formal validity, of the compromissory
clause (the clause compromissoire-the agreement to submit fu-
ture disputes to arbitration) were to be deduced from the provi-
sions applying to the compromis (i.e., the agreement to submit ex-
isting disputes to arbitration).16 In the mid-nineteenth century, the
Cour de cassation" (tbe French Supreme Court) held that com-
promissory clauses were unlawful in French domestic law, because
by their nature, they could not satisfy the two-fold requirements
for the validity of the compromis.
Subsequent legislation enacted in 1925 modified this judicial
doctrine by providing that compromissory clauses were lawful in
certain commercial matters. is Despite this limited legislative ap-
proval, legislative provisions specifically applying to the com-
promissory clause had not been enacted. The legal regime applying
to the compromissory clause still was subject to the rules relating
16. Nou. C. PR. CIV. arts. 1005-07 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). See also P. HERZOG, supra note
11, at 514.
17. Article 1006 of the Code de procedure civile [C. Pi. civ.] provided that a valid com-
promis, the submission to arbitration of an existing dispute, must define the subject matter
of the dispute and name the arbitrators. See Nou. C. PR. Clv. art. 1006 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979)
(now repealed). In L'Alliance c. Prunier, the Cour de cassation ruled that compromissory
clauses were unlawful in French domestic law based upon a construction of article 1006 of
the civil procedure code. The court reasoned that the clause compromissoire, the arbitration
clause relating to future disputes, was unlawful since, by its very nature, it could not satisfy
the requirements applying to the compromis. See 43 Sirey, Jurisprudence de la Cour de
cassation 561 (1843) (Cr. cass. civ., July 10, 1943).
18. P. HERZOG, supra note 11, at 513 n.169. See also Code de commerce [C. coM.] art.
631 (Fr.) (Dalloz 75th ed. 1979-80).
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to the compromis. In addition, article 2061 of the Code civil19 sta-
ted that the clause was null and void unless otherwise provided by
law, buttressing the notion of the limited validity of the corn-
promissory clause in French Law. Under French legislation, the
compromis was considered the primary arbitration agreement, a
position which did not reflect the realities of actual practice or con-
cord with the legislation of other countries.20
B. The New Regime
Articles 2 to 10 of the Decree21 establish two separate legal
regimes for arbitration agreements: one applying to the corn-
promissory clause and the other to the compromis. The new legis-
lation thereby expressly recognizes the legal validity of the com-
promissory clause and that it is, in fact, frequently resorted to in
domestic commercial transactions.22 As a result, once a dispute
arises, parties bound by a compromissory clause no longer need to
enter into a compromis in order to initiate the process of arbitra-
tion.23 Now, once the parties have nominated the arbitrators, the
arbitration can begin without any formalities relating to a
compromis.
24
C. Problems Which Fall Outside the Purview of the New
Regime
Despite this change in the procedure for initiating arbitration,
the new provisions do not provide or pretend to provide a ready-
made solution to all the problems that can arise at this stage of the
arbitral proceeding. The Decree simply accomplishes the elimina-
tion of one of the formalities for initiating arbitration. The parties
can still disagree as to the definition of the subject matter of the
dispute submitted to arbitration and delay, the arbitral proceeding
in this way. While a compromis would not necessarily be required
in such circumstances, it seems that the court articulated rules
19. C. civ. art. 2061 (Dalloz 79th ed. 1979-80).
20. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 189-91.
21. Decree, supra note 12, arts. 2-10, at 1238.
22. See Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 7 (citing Judgment of June 20,
1957, Cass. civ. [1957] 2 J.C.P. No. 10773).
23. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 190. Note that although this
requirement formerly was contested by some practitioners and apparently limited by court
interpretation in the commercial context, it seemed to be valid as a general rule.
24. Id.
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which applied before the Decree was enacted would still be rele-
vant and could be applied in such a situation.25
These rules provide, for example, that problems as to the defi-
nition of the subject matter of the dispute should be resolved by
adopting the definition proposed in the request of the most dili-
gent party. Also, when one party has accepted his co-contractant's
offer to arbitrate, the court articulated rules provide that the of-
feror's definition of the subject matter of the dispute should
prevail.
26
If the courts interpreted the compromissory clause as an es-
sential element of the contract (i.e., as one of the principal motives
which led the parties to enter into the agreement), its invalidity,
stemming from the failure to satisfy the mandatory technical re-
quirements, could lead to the avoidance of the entire contract.27
The Decree negates the possibility of such a result; article 6 pro-
vides that, when a court rules that a compromissory clause is void,
the clause is simply deemed not to have been written.28 In other
words, its nullity has no effect upon the other provisions of the
contract unless the parties have expressly stipulated that the valid-
ity of the entire contract is dependent upon the validity of the
compromissory clause. Once a court has held the compromissory
clause to be void, nothing prevents the parties, if they still wish to
have their dispute resolved through arbitration, to agree to a com-
promis; otherwise, since no arbitration agreement exists, the reso-
lution of the dispute lies within the jurisdiction of the courts.
These new provisions demonstrate that, in those commercial
cases in which it is recognized as legally valid, the compromissory
clause is considered as the principal type of arbitration agreement,
and the compromis is relegated to a deserved secondary status.
The former prominence of the compromis probably reflected the
vestiges of the judicial hostility towards the compromissory clause.
The fact that the antecedent legislation spoke exclusively in terms
of the compromis reflected an antiquated conception of arbitration
and a misunderstanding of the realities of the dispute resolution
process in the commercial area.29
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Judgment of June 8, 1972, Cr. Paris, [1973] REv. ARE. 39; Judgment of
May 24, 1974, Cr. Paris, [1974] Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S. Jur.] 706; Judg-
ment of November 13, 1972, Cass. comm., [1973] REV. ARE. 150.
27. Id.
28. Id.




Articles 2 and 7 of the Decree"0 elaborate definitions of the
two types of arbitration agreement, a feature which was not in-
cluded in the repealed legislation even in regard to the compro-
mis.3' Both types of arbitration agreements must be in writ-
ing32 -presumably to avoid evidentiary problems. The chief
difference between the two legal regimes is that, in order to be
valid, the compromissory clause need only name or provide a pro-
modification, however, was only partial in that the lawfulness of the compromissory clause
was recognized only in commercial cases. The development of arbitration has taken place
chiefly in the commercial area and, in reality, the compromissory clause did not need a more
extensive legal validity than was conferred upon it.
30. Decree, supra note 12, arts. 2 & 7, at 1238.
31. Although the Decree has explicitly recognized the compromissory clause, the recent
Code civil title on arbitration, which relates primarily to the question of the arbitrability of
disputes, still speaks in terms of the compromis. Article 1061 of that title established as a
general rule that the compromissory clause is void notwithstanding certain exceptions. This
evident discrepancy between the attitude toward compromissory clauses that has been in-
corporated in the Code civil and the concept adopted by the Decree is perhaps the sign of a
forthcoming change in the official status of the compromissory clause under French domes-
tic law. The two texts dealing with arbitration do not have the same legislative origins or
stature; the provisions in the Code civil were the product of a parliamentary law, while the
Decree was enacted under the regulatory power of the executive branch and, therefore, does
not have the stature of a parliamentary law. It appears, in fact, that the parliamentary route
for enactment was disregarded deliberately to avoid modifications in the technical nature of
the text and to guarantee that its provisions would respond to the practical realities of arbi-
tration. In these circumstances, and in light of the obsolete character of the Code civil atti-
tude toward arbitration, the provisions of the Decree relating to the compromissory clause
should be regarded as suggestion, i.e., as a discreet first step in the process of changing the
language and the substance of the arbitration provisions in the Code civil. In any event, the
Code civil provisions do not give rise to any immediate legal problems or create legal obsta-
cles which could hamper the implementation of the Decree; nor do they place an undue
burden upon the process of French domestic arbitration. Nevertheless, they are troublesome
simply because the language is essentially an historical remnant that no longer has any cur-
rency in arbitral practice. The provisions of the Decree are certainly a step toward the adop-
tion of a modem general policy in the area of arbitration agreements. For this discussion,
the author has relied in part on Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 190, n.2.
32. Id. arts. 3 & 9, at 1238. There is a slight discrepancy between these two apparently
similar provisions. While article 3 states that the compromissory clause "must, upon pain of
nullity, be stipulated in writing," article 9 states simply that the compromis (submission) "is
ascertained (constat) in writing." In other words, when the substance of these two particu-
lar articles is compared, the mandatory formal requirement that the agreement be in writing
appears to apply only to the compromissory clause. The provisions of article 8(1), stating
that a submission "must, under pain of nullity, define the subject matter of the dispute,"
however, seems to imply that the submission also must be in written form. The discrepancy
between articles 3 and 9 does not appear, therefore, to create a disparity between the two
types of arbitration agreements on this point. Both agreements, it seems, must be done in
writing since it is unlikely that the submission could define the subject matter of the dispute
without being in writing.
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cedure for naming the arbitrators,"3 while the compromis also must
define the subject matter of the dispute.3 4 According to established
jurisprudence in this area, the nullity of a compromis resulting
from its failure to define the subject matter of the dispute is not
ordre public, i.e., not a matter of mandatory public policy, and can
be waived by the parties."
The option afforded to the parties either to actually name the
arbitrators or simply provide for a procedure by which they are to
be named attests to the generally liberal tenor of the enacted re-
forms and to the willingness of the drafters to align the new rules
along the lines of actual arbitral practice. The prior legislation ex-
pressly required that the parties name the arbitrators in their
agreements.36 Thus, in many instances and for a variety of reasons,
the parties to an arbitration agreement would stipulate only that
the arbitrators should be designated in a particular way rather
than actually name them. The actual nomination usually was han-
dled by an arbitration center. The new legislation, then, gives rec-
ognition, albeit implicitly, to the importance of arbitral centers and
the regulations they establish to nominate arbitrators. 7
Finally, in regard to the compromis and in keeping with the
spirit of the other provisions, article 8(3) of the Decrees provides
that, if one of the named arbitrators refuses to take up his terms of
reference, the compromis is tainted only with a relative nullity i.e.,
it becomes temporarily void (caduc) and not absolutely void. This
distinction allows the parties to reactivate a compromis affected by
such a nullity if they consent to the nomination of another arbitra-
tor.-9 In addition, during a court action involving a dispute which
is arbitrable, the parties can enter into a compromis, agreeing to
submit the dispute brought before the court to arbitration. 0
Clearly, arbitration no longer is seen as being incompatible with
the judicial process and the administration of justice; it is seen as a
suitable dispute resolution process even when that means discon-
tinuing a legal action.
33. Id. art. 3, at 1238.
34. Id. art. 8, at 1238.
35. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 191.
36. Nou. C. PR. CIV. art. 1006 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
37. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 191.
38. Decree, supra note 12, art. 8(3), at 1238.
39. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 191.
40. Decree, supra note 12, art. 10, at 1238.
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E. The Possibility of Court Intervention: A First Look
The new legislation also provides for the possibility of court
intervention in the event that difficulties should arise in the consti-
tution of the arbitral tribunal or in the procedure for designating
the arbitrators.4 ' In these circumstances, the arbitrators are named
by either the presiding judge of the district court (the tribunal de
grande instance), or, if the parties have expressly so provided, the
presiding judge of the commercial court (the tribunal de com-
merce).42 The former legislation contained no provision relating to
this issue which is critical to parties considering whether to bind
themselves to an arbitration agreement. The Decree43 describes the
circumstances in which the courts can intervene and the scope of
their authority, noting that the judge rules on the issues that are
raised in his capacity as the juge des r~f~r~s, i.e., he treats this
matter as one of special urgency and assumes emergency jurisdic-
tion over it. 44 The intention of the new legislation on this issue
appears to be clear: the Decree does not lay the groundwork for a
type of judicial intrusion into the arbitral process, but rather seeks
to have the courts act as the indispensable complement to the arbi-
tral process.4 5 In a word, the Decree does not contemplate judicial
interference; it merely prescribes a limited and suitable form of ju-
dicial intervention in the necessary circumstances. This balance
between the authority of the courts and the independence of the
arbitral process formally introduces an element of cooperation be-
tween the two processes of dispute resolution, which, in fact, may
be the most outstanding and innovative feature of the new
legislation.
41. Id. art. 4, at 1238.
42. Id.
43. Id. arts. 14, 16, 17, & 23, at 1238-39.
44. On this point, see generally Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 189, 192.
45. For a discussion of this notion of the complementary role of the courts in the arbi-
tral process, see generally Moreau, L'intervention du tribunal au cours de la procedure
arbitrale en droit frangais et en droit compare, [1978] Rv. ARB. 321. Under this procedure,
questions of law which arise during the arbitral proceeding are submitted to the court for
resolution. For a discussion of the recent reform of the English stated case procedure which
permits parties to certain international contracts to contract out of this procedure, see Litt-
man, England Reconsiders "The Stated Case," 13 INT'L LAWYER 253 (1979). See also Lord
Hacking, U.K. Arbitration Act (1979) and U.K. State Immunity Act (1978), 8 INT'L Bus.
LAWYER 161 (1980). For an excellent discussion of this question, see Park, Judicial Super-
vision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21
HARv. IN'L L.J. 87 (1980).
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IV. GENERAL RULES OF ARBITRATION
A. The Capacity to Act as an Arbitrator
The new legislation also outlines a series of general rules relat-
ing to the arbitral process. 46 According to a distinguished French
arbitration specialist, this section of the Decree is where the "inno-
vations of the new text will appear to be most important."47 For
instance, the person of the arbitrator assumes new significance
under the Decree. The previously applicable legislation did not
contain any provisions concerning the person of the arbitrator. It
was generally recognized in early decisions of the French Supreme
Court,48 however, that collective bodies having the legal status of
an artificial person could be named to act as arbitrators. The De-
cree provides49 that only natural persons50 have the capacity to act
as arbitrators. Accordingly, in the event that the arbitration agree-
ment names an artifical person51 such as a corporate body (e.g., the
Chamber of Notaries of a particular department) to act as the ar-
bitrator, this entity has the capacity only to organize the arbitral
proceeding and not act as the arbitrator. 2 As a consequence, arbi-
tral tribunals are equated, at least to some extent, to courts of law
under this new provision. Disputes will not be arbitrated by an im-
personal collectivity, but by a group of individuals sensitive to the
purpose of arbitration.5" In addition, many of the organizational
and administrative complications which could attend the process
of arbitration by a corporate body will be eliminated.
B. Accepting the Terms of Reference
Under the Decree,5 a pre-condition to the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal is that the named arbitrators accept their terms of
46. Decree, supra note 12, arts. 11-19, at 1238-39.
47. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 191.
48. See Judgment of May 17, 1836, Cr. cass., [1837] Recueil Sirey, Jurisprudence [S.
Jur.] I 154; Judgment of December 18, 1884, Cr. cass., [1887] D.P. I 55. See also Judgment
of December 4, 1935, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1936] 1 GAZ. PALAis 347.
49. Decree, supra note 12, art. 11, at 1238.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. While the role of arbitral centers in the process of arbitration is given official recog-
nition in the new legislation, the participation of these centers in the arbitral process is
subject to some regulation. Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 191.
53. See Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 11-12.
54. Decree, supra note 12, art. 12, at 1238.
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reference. The antecedent legislation neglected to address this is-
sue. While the import of this provision may seem to be insignifi-
cant, this article of the Decree does have a special meaning. Ac-
cording to a distinguished commentator,5 5 the combined acts of
nomination by the party and acceptance by the arbitrator have the
effect of giving the terms of reference the status of an agreement
which involves reciprocal duties between the parties, thereby ac-
centuating the contractual nature of the arbitral process. Before
agreeing to satisfy the conditions of his terms of reference, an arbi-
trator is under a duty to inform both parties of any grounds which
he thinks might serve to disqualify him." His subsequent accept-
ance, then, is subject to the express agreement of both parties.
Such an agreement constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge
the arbitrator upon that specific ground.57
C. The Number of Arbitrators
Previously, the number of arbitrators that were required to
constitute an arbitral tribunal was left indeterminate. Although, in
practice, most arbitral tribunals consisted of three arbitrators,"
the lack of regulation as to the number of arbitrators left open the
possibility that only two arbitrators would be named (one by each
party) and that their deliberations could result in a deadlock. As a
consequence, the repealed law contained a series of articles 9 relat-
ing to the naming of a tiers arbitre who would be appointed to
render a ruling in the event of a division of opinion (partage) be-
tween the two arbitrators who had been named at the outset of the
process.60 The newly enacted legislation eliminated the need for
the tiers arbitre procedure by providing that arbitral tribunals
would consist either of a sole arbitrator or of several arbitrators1
of an uneven number.
D. The Time Limit Rule
The new chapter outlining general rules for arbitration also
55. Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 191.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Except in the case of quality arbitrations relating to disputes in a specialized com-
mercial field and products in which only one arbitrator would sit.
59. Nou. C. PR. civ. arts. 1017-19 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
60. Id. art. 1017.
61. Decree, supra note 12, art. 13, at 1238.
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modified slightly the time limit rule relating to the duration of the
arbitrators' terms of reference. Previously, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties, the law required that an arbitral award be forth-
coming within three months from the date of the compromis.2
Under the new legislation, the parties retain their right to set their
own time limit and the additional prerogative to lengthen it. The
legal time limit, however, has been extended to six months and
runs from the day on which the last arbitrator accepted his terms
of reference.6" The latter requirement reflects the fact that the ar-
bitral tribunal is not fully constituted until all the arbitrators have
accepted their terms of reference." Since a compromis no longer is
required to initiate the arbitral process, the extension of the legal
time limit evidences a desire on the part of the drafters of the De-
cree to devise a set of regulations which responds to the realities of
the arbitral process. In most cases under the antecedent legisla-
tion, the arbitrators could only extend the duration of their terms
of reference by having the parties agree to a new submission, which
was sometimes difficult to obtain.65
E. Judicial Intervention Defined: A Comprehensive Look
Unlike the repealed provisions, the Decree provisions squarely
address the question of when and under what circumstances a
court may intervene in the arbitral proceedings.68 As noted previ-
ously 7 judicial intervention is provided for when problems arise
regarding the nomination of the arbitrators under a compromissory
clause. Such intervention also may take place in three other sets of
circumstances: (1) when the parties have nominated an even num-
ber of arbitrators, a court may name the additional arbitrator if
the parties have failed to provide for his nomination or when the
named arbitrators cannot agree upon the choice of another arbitra-
tor;6 8 (2) in the absence of an agreement by the parties on this
question, when one of the parties or the arbitral tribunal requests
62. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 1007 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
63. Decree, supra note 12, art. 16, at 1238.
64. Id. art. 12, at 1238.
65. See Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 12.
66. The judge intervenes in his capacity as the juge des rf rs and treats the matter as
being of special urgency: This power extends only to procedural difficulties which arise in
the arbitral process and, in the vast majority of cases, the court rules without any possibility
of appeal.
67. See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.
68. Decree, supra note 12, art. 14, at 1238.
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a court to lengthen the agreed upon or legally established time
limit for the proceedings; 9 and (3) when difficulties arise concern-
ing the disqualification or the challenge (r~cusation) of an arbitra-
tor.1 0 The intervention of the court in its r~f~r6 capacity,7 1 espe-
cially in regard to an extension of the time limit, is likely to resolve
many of the former uncertainties which accompanied arbitral
proceedings. 2
The substance of these provisions clearly indicates that the
new legislation envisions the possibility of judicial intervention in
arbitral proceedings only in the exceptional and limited circum-
stances where the coercive authority of a court of law is deemed to
be necessary to the successful implementation of the arbitral pro-
ceedings. The provision for judicial intervention does not under-
mine the automony of the arbitral process. In fact, the Decree
strikes a reasonable and intelligent balance between competing
needs; i.e., preserving the independence of the arbitral process and
the flexible character of the applicable legislation, while elaborat-
ing a regulatory scheme which specifically outlines the principal in-
stances in which the authority of a court can be invoked to remedy
otherwise intractable procedural deficiencies in the process.
69. Id. art. 16, at 1238.
70. Id. art. 23, at 1239.
71. In these cases, the request is brought before the presiding judge (president) of the
court which has jurisdiction to hear the matter either upon the basis of the agreement of the
parties or the Decree provisions (article 17). In the absence of a designation in the arbitra-
tion agreement, the Decree refers to the court in the jurisdiction of which the agreement
localized the arbitral proceedings. When the arbitration agreement fails to contain such in-
dications, jurisdiction is proper where the defendant resides or, if the defendant resides
outside of France, where the plaintiff resides.
This provision, of course, places a foreign party who is engaged in an arbitration in
France with a French national party in a disadvantageous position in that the French party
has the right to bring the actions provided for before his national courts. In most cases, this
recourse to the courts would take place in cases in which the foreign and French party are
arbitrating in France or at least in cases in which French procedural rules relating to arbi-
tration apply to the arbitral proceeding. In these circumstances, the foreign party can be
held to have consented constructively to the jurisdiction of the French courts. This provi-
sion, therefore, does not seem to present any exorbitant jurisdictional character.
The Decree expressly provides that the presiding judge of the relevant court shall hear
these matters as if they were en r f/r6, that is, he shall treat them as matters of special
urgency and assume summary jurisdiction over them and hear them in his chambers. The
ruling of the court, in effect, is a type of injunction order and cannot be appealed except in
those rare circumstances in which the court is unable to name the arbitrators because the
compromissory clause is manifestly void or otherwise seriously deficient in substance. In this
case, the action on appeal would be heard in a type of adversarial proceeding (par la voie de
contredit). Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 192.
72. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 192.
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F. The Jurisdictional Effects of the Agreement to Arbitrate
Unlike the repealed provisions, the new legislation (which on
this question affirms the substance of the prior court decisions)73
expressly recognizes the jurisdictional implications of an arbitra-
tion agreement and seeks to give full legal effect to the parties'
intention to submit disputes to arbitration. Article 18 of the gen-
eral rules74 provides that a court must declare that it lacks juris-
diction to hear a dispute when that dispute is the subject of an
arbitration agreement. Thus, the article 5 affirms the fundamental
principle that the arbitral process is autonomous and independent
from the authority of the courts even though a limited form of
court intervention may be necessary. The law thereby recognizes
the jurisdictional implications of an arbitration agreement and
seeks to give full legal effect to the parties' intention to submit
disputes to arbitration."e
V. THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDING
The new regulations relating to the arbitral proceeding also re-
present a rather substantial refinement of the previously applica-
ble law. Despite the fact that arbitration is a purely contractual
and private form of justice, this section of the Decree equates it as
closely as possible to the rules applying to a public judicial pro-
ceeding, thereby giving recognition to the jurisdictional character
73. Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 192.
74. Decree, supra note 12, art. 18, at 1239.
75. Id.
76. The rule established by article 18 applies in two sets of circumstances. First, the
courts would not have jurisdiction to hear actions arising from a dispute presently before
the arbitral tribunal. Here, the key issue for judicial determination is whether the court
action actually involves the same dispute as the one submitted to arbitration. The more
typical circumstance occurs when, despite an arbitration agreement, a party brings a court
action before the dispute is submitted to the arbitral tribunal. In these instances, the court
is still obliged to declare that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. The key issue for
judicial determination here is whether the dispute was included within the terms of the
arbitration agreement. The article 18 rule would not apply in the second example if the
court found the arbitration agreement to be "manifestly void." Such a finding, it seems,
would be rare, and would consist of a clear and unequivocal violation of the requirements
that the compromissory clause be written and at least provide for a procedure by which the
arbitrators are to be nominated. The concept of an arbitration clause being "manifestly
void" appears to preclude any judicial scrutiny of the clause which would be more than
generally superficial. Finally, the article 18 rule cannot be invoked by the court on its own
motion because it is not a mandatory public policy requirement. The motion raised by one
of the parties is to be considered in a type of adversarial proceeding (par la voie de con-
tredit). Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 192.
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of the arbitral proceeding.7 7 For example, the arbitral proceeding is
described as an instance, a term usually reserved to describe court
proceedings. Although the arbitrator cannot accompany his inter-
locutory orders with a daily fine or direct mandatory orders to
third parties, he has powers comparable to the judge in matters of
discovery and other evidence gathering procedures (l'instruction).
Like court proceedings, the arbitral proceeding must be adversarial
(contraditoire). The following discussion places these features of
the Decree provisions in their proper context.
A. The Choice of Procedure
The old rule78 that the parties and the arbitral tribunal were
to follow the procedural forms and time limits established for liti-
gants and judicial hearings unless the parties agreed otherwise has
been reformulated to allow the arbitrators to regulate the arbitral
procedure themselves unless the parties provide to the contrary.7 9
Thus, the inversion of the syntactical ordering of the old provision
transforms the exception under the old law into the rule under the
new law.
Under the practice governed by the prior law, the parties fre-
quently invoked the exception, allowing the proceeding to follow a
more flexible procedure.80 Their choice was subject only to the con-
straint that the selected procedure not violate mandatory rules of
public policy.81 The new legislation takes this reality of arbitral
practice fully into account. While the parties retain the prerogative
of determining the type of procedure that is to be followed in the
proceeding, the arbitrators can either supplement insufficient pro-
visions or, when the parties have not specified a particular proce-
dure, determine which procedure is to be followed. In other words,
when the parties agree to arbitrate, i.e., to remove their disputes
from the jurisdiction of the courts, they no longer need to state
expressly that their choice also imples a waiver of the application
of the usual procedural rules to the proceeding. Now, the very exis-
tence of an arbitration agreement, without any contrary stipula-
tion, implies a waiver of the procedural rules.
77. Id. at 193.
78. Nou. C. Pa. civ. art. 1009 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
79. Decree, supra note 12, art. 20, at 1239.
80. Robert, France, in UNION INTERNATIONALE DES AVOCATS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBrrRATON 240, 245 (1956).
81. Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 10.
No. 2]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
The notion of procedural regularity is not alien to French do-
mestic arbitral proceedings. The Decree requires that the chosen
arbitral procedure must conform to the fundamental procedural
rules which apply to all litigation and dispute resolution pro-
cesses. 82 These rules, as the Decree stipulates,' are contained in
the Nouveau Code de procedure civile and represent what can be
considered to be the minimal requirements of procedural fairness
common to most advanced legal systems and indispensable to any
efficacious and equitable system of dispute resolution. These codal
provisions s4 define the basic role and responsibilities of the judge
and the litigants and mandate that the principle of a contradictory
hearing and right to legal representation be respected. 5 The appli-
cation of these rules, however, will not impair the arbitrators or the
parties from devising a flexible arbitral procedure. The new legisla-
tion is simply more specific and clearer on this matter than the
repealed provisions.88
B. A Grant of Increased Procedural Authority
The Decree also provides that, if a party detains evidence (an
6lrment de preuve), the arbitrator can enjoin him to bring it
forth.87 This express grant of authority gives the arbitral tribunal
procedural powers not contemplated under the former legislation
and, in theory, increases the authority of the arbitral tribunal in
matters of evidence gathering.88 This grant of authority corre-
sponds generally to the power that is vested in a court of law under
article 11(2) of the Nouveau Code de procedure civile to enjoin a
party to submit evidence that it has in its possession, and that the
court may buttress its order by the threat of the imposition of an
82. Decree, supra note 12, art. 20, at 1239.
83. Id.
84. For example, article 11(1) provides that the parties must cooperate in the evidence-
gathering process and that the judge can take their lack of cooperation into account in his
ruling. Article 12 states generally that the judge must procede under a ruling according to
the applicable rules of law; article 13 authorizes the judge to request that the parties submit
the legal conclusions and arguments which he deems necessary to resolve the litigation.
85. C. PR. civ. arts. 14-20.
86. In addition to article 1009, the former provisions of the civil procedure code con-
tained no other provisions relating specifically to the procedural details of the arbitral pro-
ceeding and certainly did not align the procedure to be followed by the arbitrators according
to the basic rules of French procedural law, thereby creating some degree of uncertainty as
to how the arbitral proceeding should take place.
87. Decree, supra note 12, art. 20, at 1239.
88. See Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 13.
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astreinte, a daily fine for the failure to comply with the court or-
der.89 Since the Decree explicitly excluded a reference to article
11(2), there is some question as to whether the arbitral tribunal,
under the new legislation, has the authority to attach an astreinte
to its order.
Although, under previous arbitral practice,90 it was generally
recognized that the arbitral tribunal could accompany its award
with an astreinie, it was unclear whether this power applied both
to the final award and to interlocutory awards. The decisional law
drew a distinction between the comminatory and non-comminatory
astreintes.1 Since the non-comminatory astreinte was the
equivalent of compensatory damages (dommages-intgrgts), the
courts held that the arbitrators did not have the power to impose
such fines without being specifically authorized to do so by the
parties to the arbitration agreement. The Decree does not state ex-
pressly that such pecuniary sanctions can accompany an interlocu-
tory award rendered by the arbitral tribunal ordering one of the
parties to produce evidence. It seems that the principal recourse of
the arbitral tribunal, under the Nouveau Code de procedure civile,
is to take the non-complying party's lack of cooperation into ac-
count in rendering the final award.9 2 While the Decree recognizes
the jurisdictional character of the arbitral process, its contractual
nature is not totally erased and the legislation cannot avoid the
undeniable fact that the arbitral tribunal has no public authority
or mandate.
Other. remedial procedures are available in these circum-
stances. When a party refuses to comply with the interlocutory
award, the other party or the tribunal itself could request that a
court intervene to order compliance. Alternatively, the tribunal or
the party could seek an enforcement order for the award. Since the
recourse to such procedures would prolong (perhaps considerably)
the arbitral proceeding, a more expedient solution might be to
have the arbitral tribunal rely upon its article 11(1) powers in
these circumstances.
The arbitral tribunal's express power to enjoin the production
of evidence extends only to the parties to the arbitration and does
not apply to third parties. When asked to give legal force to awards
89. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 11(2) (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
90. See, e.g., Judgment of October 20, 1959, [1960] J.C.P. H No. 11449 (Mazaud, Note).
91. See, e.g., J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at H8.
92. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 11(1) (Dalloz 72 ed. 1979).
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rendered against third parties, the courts may be somewhat reluc-
tant to satisfy such requests since the third parties in question are
not involved in the arbitration, which is a private form of justice
applying only to the contracting parties. On this issue, the drafters
of the Decree could be accused of being timid and failing to ad-
dress the problems in this area squarely. The drafters' reticence
may be due in large part to the fact that, no matter how advanced
the legislative concept of arbitration may be, arbitral proceedings
and rulings by themselves can never have the full authority of law.
While this new grant of procedural authority is a welcomed addi-
tion to the powers of the arbitral tribunal, its effectiveness as a
tool for facilitating the gathering of evidence in French domestic
arbitral proceedings can be determined only in the course of future
arbitral practice.
C. Other Provisions
Many of the other provisions in this section restate the sub-
stance of the previously applicable rules without any significant
modification either in language or in meaning. The issues treated
by these provisions essentially concern: (1) the termination, dis-
qualification, and challenge of the arbitrators; 3 (2) under what
conditions, other than the rendering of an award, the arbitral pro-
ceeding will end;94 and (3) how many arbitrators conduct the evi-
93. Decree, supra note 12, arts. 22 & 23, at 1239. The former provision on this subject
consisted of Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 1014 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1969). There are, of course, some
differences, albeit of relatively minor consequence, between the former and the newly-en-
acted provisions. Former article 1014 provided that the arbitrators could not resign from
their functions once the proceeding had begun and that they could not be disqualified ex-
cept on grounds which had surfaced since the compromis (submission) had been entered
into. The new provisions essentially restate these basic rules with some minor modifications.
Article 22 provides that all arbitrators must pursue their terms of reference until they have
been fulfilled and that an arbitrator cannot be disqualified except by the unanimous consent
of the parties. Article 23 provides that an arbitrator cannot refrain from adjudicationg or be
disqualified except for a ground of challenge which surfaced since his nomination. Moreover,
difficulties arising from the application of article 23 are to be brought before the presiding
judge of the competent tribunal. Except for the latter point-the significance of which has
already been discussed in the text (notes 67-74 supra)-there is nothing of substance which
is fundamentally new in these provisions. They simply provide for clearer and somewhat
more detailed rules in this area. But see Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 12.
94. Decree, supra note 12, art. 24, at 1239. The former provision on this question con-
sisted of Nou. C. PR. ciV. art. 1012 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). Again, there are certain minor
differences between the respective texts. Former article 1012 provided that the compromis
(submission)-hence one would assume the arbitral proceeding-would end in three sets of
circumstances: (1) by the death, refusal to adjudicate, resignation or inability to arbitrate of
an arbitrator unless there was a subsequent agreement or the choice of a replacement for
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dence gathering process and the establishing of the record. 5 On
this latter point, the Decree states that the parties can agree to
have one expert arbitrator handle technical matters."
D. Witnesses
In regard to witnesses, the Decree expressly states that third
parties will not testify under oath,97 reflecting the fact that the ar-
bitral tribunal does not have the authority to reach a finding of
perjury and to prosecute the allegedly culpable party.98 This provi-
sion, however, does not prohibit the arbitral tribunal from hearing
the parties under oath-a procedure which was admitted in previ-
ous French domestic arbitral practice,90 although not expressly
provided for in the former law. Under previous practice, 00 there
also was the possibility of questioning the parties under a limited
the arbitrator was left to the parties or to the remaining arbitrator(s); (2) by the expiration
of the time limit established by the parties or-in the absence of the former-by the law (in
the latter case, a 3-month time limit); (3) by a deadlock (division of opinion-partage)
among the arbitrators if the latter did not have the authority to name a tiers arbitre.
The new provisions basically simplify and modify to a certain extent the previous rules.
Article 24 of the Decree provides specifically that the arbitral proceeding will end in three
sets of circumstances: (1) by the disqualification, death, or inability to adjudicate of an arbi-
trator as well as by the fact that an arbitrator loses the full exercise of his legal rights
(droits civils); (2) by the abstention or challenge of an arbitrator; (3) by the expiration of
the time limit for arbitration. The article, which eliminates any reference to the compromis,
adds that these rules can be modified by the particular agreements of the parties. The most
notable feature of the new rules consists in the fact that reference no longer is made to the
partage (deadlock) between the arbitrators, since that situation no longer is possible under
the new procedural rules (see text accompanying notes 53-61, supra). Also, the reference to
the arbitrator's loss of full exercise of his legal rights is new. This situation can occur either
when an arbitrator is imprisoned or when he is placed under legal guardianship for a serious
alteration of his mental and/or physical capacities. In this sense, the arbitral provisions are
in keeping with the latest reforms of the Code civil dealing with the law of persons. C. civ.,
Bk 1 (Dalloz 79th ed. 1979-80). Otherwise, article 24 of the Decree does not introduce any-
thing of a substantive nature which is new, although the reason underlying the distinction it
establishes between the disqualification (r~vocation) and the inability to adjudicate of an
arbitrator (first ground for termination of the arbitral proceeding) and the abstention (ab-
stention) or the challenge (r~eusation) of an arbitrator is not altogether clear.
95. Decree, supra note 12, art. 21(1), at 1239. The former provision consisted of Nou. C.
PR. civ. art. 1011 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). A comparison of the relevant parts of the two provi-
sions reveals that, despite an extra noun in the former article 1011--du ministgte- there is
no significant semantic or stylistic difference between them.
96. Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 10.
97. Decree, supra note 12, art. 21(2), at 1239.
98. Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 194.
99. E.g., J. ROBERT & B. MoREAu, supra note 5, at J4.
100. Id. at J5. See also Judgment of December 3, 1965, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1966],
J.C.P. H No. 14625 (Boulbbs, Note) and [1966] REv. ARB. 23.
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form of cross-examination (contradictoirement) when the parties
entered a special appearance (a comparution personnelle). The
new legislation, however, is silent on this issue and fails to address
the question of how much weight the arbitral tribunal is to attri-
bute to oral testimony. The omissions of the Decree on these mat-
ters may stem from the fact that oral testimony is not generally
considered fundamental under French procedural law1 01 and from
an intent to align arbitral proceedings with generally applicable
procedural rules.
E. Submission of Arguments and Deliberations
The antecedent legislation provided that the parties were re-
quired to submit their evidence and present their arguments
fifteen days before the expiration of the time limit for arbitra-
tion.102 The Decree makes no such restriction, leaving the matter
to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal.103 The flexibility of the
new rule reflects the type of pragmatism that accommodates the
nature and realities of arbitration.
F. Staying the Proceeding
Other innovations relate to the conditions under which the ar-
bitral proceeding can be stayed. Under the former legislation, the
arbitral tribunal was required to stay the proceeding when a party
made a plea of forgery (inscription de faux) or the proceeding gave
rise to a point of criminal law (incident criminel).1 4 While the for-
mer legislation did not address this issue specifically, it seems that
a proceeding would be stayed in the event that one of the parties,
arguing that the arbitration agreement was void, challenged the ju-
risdiction of the arbitral tribunal to hear the matter.10 5 Many
French legal scholars argued that arbitrators had the power to rule
upon such a jurisdictional challenge. 06 The French Supreme
101. See Nou. C. PR. civ. arts. 143-221 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
102. Id. art. 1016.
103. Decree, supra note 12, art. 28, at 1239. The date for concluding arguments and for
taking the matter into deliberation (la mise en d~lib~r6) is set by the arbitral tribunal when
it deems the evidence-gathering process to be complete. The tribunal's decision should take
into account the applicable time limit rule, but that time limit can always be extended.
After this date, the parties no longer can present arguments or introduce new documenta-
tion, unless the arbitral tribunal so requests.
104. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 1015 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
105. See, e.g., J. ROBERT & B. MoREAu, supra note 5, at H1O.
106. J. RuBELLIN-DEVIcHI, supra note 7, at § 315; Klein, in [1961] RPv. ARB. 48; Metz-
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Court, however, consistently held that arbitrators could not as-
sume jurisdictional authority upon the basis of an allegedly invalid
agreement. 107 A number of cours d'appel, however, had held to the
contrary,108 and this crucial point of French arbitration law re-
mained unsettled.
G. Jurisdictional Authority to Hear Jurisdictional Challenge
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz)
The substance of articles 26 and 27 of the Decree 109 appears to
settle the kompetenz-kompetenz controversy. 110 Under the Decree,
any stay of the arbitral proceeding is governed by the provisions of
articles 369 to 376 of the Nouveau Code de procedure civile.111,
These provisions contain basic procedural rules which describe, in-
ter alia, the specific and rather limited circumstances in which an
action will be stayed, when a stay can be terminated voluntarily,
and the effect of a stay upon the court's jurisdiction over the
matter.
11 2
ger, in [1957] REv. ARB. 8; Motulsky, in [1957] J.C.P. II No. 10165 & [1954] J.C.P. I No.
1194.
107. Judgment of January 11, 1960, Cr. cass. [1960] REv. ARB. 44; Judgment of June 10,
1958, Cr. cass. [1958] Bulletin des arr~ts de la Cour de cassation, chambres civiles, [Bull.
Civ.] HI 208; Judgment of October 14, 1957, REv. TIUM. DR. CIV. 659; Judgment of October 6,
1953, [1954] S. Jur. I 149.
108. Judgment of April 4, 1968, Cour d' appel, Paris, [1968] REV. ARB. 18; Judgment of
February 21, 1964, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1964] REv. ARB. 55; Judgment of March 21, 1963,
Cour d'appel, Paris, [1963] REv. ARB. 125; Judgment of June 14, 1963, Cour d'appel, Paris,
[1962] REV. ARB. 107; Judgment of September 9, 1962, Cour d'appel, Douai, [1962] REV. ARB.
51; Judgment of March 8, 1960, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1960], Dalloz, Sommaires 72; Judg-
ment of May 22, 1958, Cour d'appel, Paris [1958] Rev. arb. 57; Judgment of January 22,
1957, Cour d'appel, Paris [1957] J.C.P. II No. 10165.
109. Decree, supra note 12, arts. 26 & 27, at 1239.
110. The power of the arbitral tribunal to rule upon a matter involving a challenge to
its own jurisdiction.
111. Decree, supra note 12, art. 25, at 1239. This second formal reference to the provi-
sions of the Nouveau Code de procdure civile in this title dealing with the arbitral pro-
ceeding bears witness to the drafters' intent to align the arbitral proceeding with the new
French procedural law in instances where such an alignment simplifies procedural points
and does not infringe upon the flexibility and independence of the arbitral procedure.
112. Nou. C. PR. civ. arts. 369-76 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). Moreover, according to article
27 of the Decree, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the arbitral tribunal now has the
recognized authority to rule upon a plea concerning the identification of a handwriting
(l'incident de vkrification d'&criture) or a plea of forgery (lincident de faux) regarding a
simple private agreement which is signed but not sealed or witnessed (acte sous seing privg)
again according to the relevant provisions of the Nouveau Code de procedure civile. Nou. C.
PR. civ. arts. 287-94, 299. In the event that an incidental plea of forgery (l'inscription de
faux incidente) is raised, however, against a sealed instrument drawn up by a French notary
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Most significantly, the Decree provides that arbitrators have
the power to rule upon a question concerning their own jurisdic-
tion, obviating the need to stay the arbitral proceedings in order to
take this matter directly before a court of law. Article 2611s states
that in the event that one of the parties makes a motion before the
arbitral tribunal challenging its jurisdictional power (either in its
principle or in its scope), the arbitral tribunal may rule upon the
validity or the limits of its investiture.11" This provision seems to
put an end to the longstanding debate on this issue between the
French Supreme Court, French legal scholars, and the cours
d'appel.
15
H. The Implications of the Jurisdictional Rule
The drafters must have chosen the language of this provision
with great care. For example, the substance of the provision ap-
plies when a jurisdictional challenge is raised before the arbitral
tribunal.11 This qualification implies that when such a motion is
made before a court (usually, once an award has been rendered
through a means of recourse action), the latter can still rule upon
the issue. In other words, the grant of authority to the arbitral tri-
bunal does not preclude the courts from ruling on this question.
The new rule, however, does not expressly prohibit a party ob-
jecting to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal from addressing
the jurisdictional motion directly to a court at the outset of the
arbitral proceeding. In doing so, however, the party exhibits bad
faith and an intention to undermine the parties' original intention
to arbitrate disputes. In light of the arbitrators' express authority
to rule upon matters involving their own competence, and since
court scrutiny can be exercised at the means of recourse stage of
the process, the courts may be reluctant in these circumstances to
assume jurisdiction over the matter. In any event, the arbitral tri-
bunal no longer needs to stay the proceedings. when a jurisdictional
(acte authentique), the arbitral proceeding must be stayed and an action brought before a
court of law. See Decree, supra note 12, art. 27, at 1239; Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 313 (Dalloz 72d
ed. 1969). This distinction between the two types of the pleas of forgery was not clearly
drawn under the old law, although court rulings had acted as a supplement to the former
legislation on this question. See Nou. C. FR. civ. art. 1015 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979); Robert,
Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 194.
113. Decree, supra note 12, art. 26, at 1239.
114. See text accompanying notes 106-08 supra.





I. Challenge to the Principle or Scope of Jurisdiction
A jurisdictional challenge can attack either the principle or the
scope of arbitral jurisdiction. 117 This double qualification refers to
the two sets of circumstances in which jurisdictional objections can
be raised: (1) on the ground that the arbitration agreement itself is
void; and (2) on the ground that the dispute, brought before the
arbitral tribunal, goes beyond or is not included in the terms of the
arbitration agreement. 1 8 Accordingly, when a jurisdictional chal-
lenge is raised in the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal has the au-
thority to rule upon either the validity (corresponding to the chal-
lenge of the principle of jurisdiction) or the limits (corresponding
to a challenge of the scope of jurisdiction) of its investiture. 19
J. The Separability Controversy
Despite its careful wording and its apparent comprehensive-
ness, article 26 leaves one fundamental problem unresolved,
namely, whether the arbitral tribunal retains its newly established
jurisdictional authority when a party alleges that the arbitral tri-
bunal lacks jurisdiction because the principal contract in which the
arbitration agreement is contained is void and this defect implies
the nullity of the arbitration agreement. Although the French
courts recognized the juridical autonomy of the compromissory
clause through the separability doctorine in matters relating to in-
ternational commercial arbitration, 20 the French Supreme Court
had refused to incorporate this doctrine in domestic arbitral juris-
prudence.2' The courts deemed the arbitration agreement to be an
accessory part of the principal contract; as a consequence, its valid-
ity was dependent upon the validity of the main agreement.122
The language of article 26 simply is not specific enough to jus-
tify the conclusion that the separability doctrine has become part
of French domestic arbitration law. One distinguished commenta-
117. Id.
118. Id.; J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at H10.
119. Decree, supra note 12, art. 26, at 1239.
120. See Judgment of May 7, 1963, Cass. civ. Ire, [1963] J.C.P. IIl No. 13405. See also
Goldmann, Note, [1964] JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL [J. DR. INT'L.] 82; Bredin, Note,
[1963] Recueil Dalloz, Jurisprudence [D. Jur.] 545; Robert, Note, [1963] Rav. ARB. 60.
121. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
122. See, e.g., Etabl. Soules, Feb. 19, 1958, Cass. civ., [1958] D. Jur. 531.
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tor123 described the import of article 26 by stating that it "resolves
in the most liberal way a quarrel which for the last twenty years
has divided the courts, ' 124 and that its language "leaves no doubt
in one's mind" as to the separability issue. 125 Another commenta-
tor128 agreed, but upon the basis of a close reading of the text it-
self. In his view, the reference to the notion of investiture implied
that the granting of jurisdictional authority extended to circum-
stances in which the parties contested the validity of the corn-
promissory clause upon the basis of the fact that the principal con-
tract in which it was included was void.127 He buttressed his
interpretation with a reference to a 1971 French Supreme Court
decision 128 in which the court apparently adopted the position ad-
vanced by the cours d'appel that arbitrators could rule upon ques-
tions relating to their investiture. The substance of this holding, it
is argued, was incorporated into the new legislation.
A single case, however, may not be enough to reverse the con-
sistent hesitation in the prior decisional law. Moreover, the impli-
cations of this ruling, in the final analysis, depend upon what
meaning is attributed to the concept of investiture and its validity.
Usually, investiture is juxtaposed to competence. Competence re-
fers to a jurisdictional challenge alleging that the dispute submit-
ted to arbitration is not covered by the terms of the arbitration
agreement. Investiture refers to a jurisdictional challenge alleging
that the arbitration agreement itself is void and, therefore, that the
arbitrators do not have the jurisdictional basis upon which to as-
sume their powers. The challenge to the investiture of the arbitral
tribunal does not necessarily include circumstances in which the
alleged nullity of the arbitration agreement is based upon the inva-
lidity of the principal contract. In any event, one would think that
the integration of the separability doctrine in domestic law would
represent such a fundamental change that the Decree would have
addressed the issue squarely. Article 26 should have contained
some express language referring to the juridical autonomy of the
compromissory clause similar to the Gosset holding 2 9 in the area
of international arbitration.
123. Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 194.
124. Id.
125. Telephone interview with Maitre Jean Robert in Paris on June 12, 1980.
126. Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 8.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Judgment of May 6, 1971, Cass. civ. 2e, [1971] Bull. Civ. II 121).
129. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
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It may be more prudent to interpret the grant of increased
jurisdictional powers and the contradistinctive silence on the sepa-
rability question as constituting an implicit invitation to the courts
ruling in future litigation to recognize and adopt the separability
doctrine in domestic arbitral matters by using the broad language
of article 26 as a means of justifying that recognition and adoption.
Such an interpretation not only would eliminate the somewhat un-
justifiable disparity between the legal regimes applying to domestic
and international arbitration matters, but also would give article
26 its full potential impact and attribute an even greater measure
of autonomy to the process of arbitration in French domestic law.
On its face, article 26 appears to be a moderate step forward which
leaves the question of whether the separability doctrine should be
adopted as part of the domestic law for future judicial
determination.
The substance of article 26 deserves a final remark. In one
clause describing the challenge that a party may bring, the article
refers to the "jurisdictional power" of the arbitral tribunal, while
in the following clause it speaks about the arbitral tribunal's au-
thority to rule upon the validity and the limits of its "investi-
ture." 130 At first blush, these different terms seem to refer to the
same idea; both clauses contain parallel constructions which refer
to the basic validity and scope of the arbitral tribunal's jurisdic-
tion. Although the absence of the word "competence" in this con-
text is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that it is usually
employed to refer to issues and problems relating to jurisdictional
matters, the phrase "jurisdictional power" is synonymous with that
term and perhaps is a more transparent expression of the notion to
which it refers. It seems that the use of two different terms, i.e.,
jurisdictional power and investiture, may have been a response by
the learned drafters to a distinction made by the French Supreme
Court in the mid-nineteenth century between the notion of compe-
tence and that of investiture.
In an 1842 case,131 the Court stated that although an arbitral
tribunal could interpret the substance and scope of a compromis-
sory clause in relation to its competence, it could not rule upon its
ability to hear a matter when the act which invested it with its
mission was alleged to be void. The court reasoned that since ar-
130. Decree, supra note 12, art. 26, at 1239.
131. Judgment of Aug. 2, 1842, Cass. civ., [1842] S. Jur. I 823; see also Judgment of
Dec. 2, 1839, Cass. civ. [1840] S. Jur. I 237.
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bitral tribunals did not have the permanent judicial character of a
public body, but rather were specially created by private indi-
viduals for certain particular cases, the question of ascertaining
whether they had legally been instituted as judges did not raise a
competence issue. According to the court, this gave rise to a ques-
tion of investiture which could not be resolved by the arbitral
tribunal.
13 2
Despite the fact that this distinction between competence and
investiture was established at a time when the French courts, espe-
cially the Supreme Court, exhibited a strong hostility to domestic
arbitration,3 3 it is possible that the drafters had it in mind when
they wrote the substance of article 26. Although this early distinc-
tion did not surface expressly in the more contemporary jurispru-
dence, the French Supreme Court, in its modern rulings, continued
to oppose the position that arbitrators had the power to rule upon
their own jurisdiction,134 thereby supporting the conclusion that
the competence-investiture distinction could still be resorted to in
the circumstances of an appropriate case.
In light of this history, the use of the term investiture in the
Decree clearly affirmed the position that the arbitral tribunal has
the power not only to rule upon whether its jurisdiction extends to
the resolution of a particular dispute, but also to challenges that
are based upon the alleged invalidity of the arbitration agreement
itself. As noted previously, this interpretation is supported by the
two double references to the validity and scope of the jurisdictional
powers. Despite arguments to the contrary, it seems that it cannot
fairly be said that the reference to the validity of the arbitral tri-
bunal's investiture implies the recognition of the separability doc-
trine in circumstances in which the invalidity of the arbitration
agreement is alleged to stem from the fact that the principal con-
tract is void.
VI. THE ARBITRAL AWARD
A. The Prior Legislation
Only two articles of the repealed provisions directly concerned
the arbitral award. 135 First, in order to be legally enforceable, do-
132. Id.
133. See text accompanying note 17 supra (reference to L'Alliance c. Prmier).
134. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
135. Nou. C. PR. civ. arts. 1020-21 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). In addition, former article
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mestic arbitral awards had to be granted an exequatur from a
court. Secondly, the enforcement order was to be granted by the
presiding judge of the district court (president du tribunal de
grande instance) of the jurisdiction in which the award was
granted.136 Despite the existence of these provisions, there was de-
bate between the courts and legal scholars as to when an arbitral
award acquired res judicata effect or autoritg de la chose jugge.
The courts, including both the cours d'appel and the Supreme
Court, took the position that an arbitral award had res judicata
effect only when it had been granted an exequatur;13 7 legal schol-
ars maintained that arbitral awards had res judicata effect once
they were rendered by the arbitral tribunal. 138
B. The New Regime
The new legislation has expanded and substantially reorgan-
ized the provisions relating to the arbitral award. It includes some
twelve articles which, although they are not all new in substance,
fill in gaps, confirm the validity of existing jurisprudential princi-
ples, and restructure the body of applicable law into a more coher-
ent whole. In general, this title of the Decree establishes a very
close parallel between the basic procedural requirements applying
to court judgments and the rules it lays down for arbitral awards,
aligning, for the sake of clarity and coherence, the procedural law
relating to arbitration upon the basic provisions of the Nouveau
Code de procedure civile.
1022 provided that arbitral awards could not be brought against third parties. The third
title of the Decree outlines rules regarding the arbitral award. See Decree, supra note 12,
arts. 29-40, at 1239. According to the French commentary (Robert, Decree Commentary,
supra note 9, at 195), this was an area in which the Decree had the least to innovate. That
observation, however, takes into account actual arbitral practice, court articulated rules re-
garding the arbitral award and, to a lesser degree, the isolated provisions of the antecedent
legislation.
136. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 1020 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
137. See Judgment of December 22, 1959, Cass. civ., [1960] D. Jur. 685; Judgment of
May 19, 1961, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1961] J.C.P. II No. 12329; Judgment of June 29, 1961,
[1962] REV. ARB. 59. Accord Judgment of December 5, 1963, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1964]
J.C.P. II No. 13481. See also [1964] D. Jur. 582, [1964] lEv. AR. 15.
138. 5 GLASSON, TISSIER, MOREL, TRAITE DE PROCEDURE § 1840; J. RUBELLIN-DEVICHI,
supra note 7 at § 515; Motulsky, in [1961] J.C.P. II No. 12204. See also P. HERZOG, supra
note 11, at 529.
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1. Confidentiality of Deliberations and the Majority Character of
Awards
The Decree'39 requires that the deliberations between the ar-
bitrators be confidential1 0 and that arbitral awards, like court de-
cisions, need to be rendered only upon the basis of a majority
vote. 141 The previous legislation made no mention of these matters,
but, in a 1967 decision, the Cour d'appel of Paris held that the
principle of secrecy applied to arbitrators as well as to judges of
the ordinary courts. 42 There was, however, some doubt as to
whether this isolated decision actually resolved the issue insofar as
the old provisions permitted arbitral tribunals to be composed of
two arbitrators, and provided for the naming of a tiers arbitre in
the event of a division of opinion (partage) between the two
named arbitrators.143 This procedure required the divided arbitra-
tors to give their separate reasoned opinions in the same or sepa-
rate records,4 thereby requiring them, in effect, to reveal the sub-
stance of their deliberations. The new legislation obviates the need
for the tiers arbitre procedure,' 45 and, as a consequence, it seems
that arbitrators can be held professionally liable for failing to keep
the deliberations concerning an award confidential.
The secrecy requirement explains in part the implications of
the rule which provides that arbitral awards need be rendered only
upon the basis of a majority vote.146 By law, arbitral awards, like
court decisions, reflect only the majority opinion among the arbi-
trators, thereby implying that, in some cases, the award will not be
a unanimous determination. Dissenting court opinions are never
expressed or published in France since the courts render only one
opinion. 47 The equating of arbitral awards with court judgments
in this regard and the application of confidentiality to arbitral de-
liberations, then, might preclude dissenting opinions of the minor-
ity arbitrator(s) from being made available to the parties either
with the award or afterwards.
139. Nou. C. PR. civ. arts. 448-49 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
140. Decree, supra note 12, art. 29, at 1239.
141. Id. art. 30, at 1239. See also Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 195.
142. Judgment of Jan. 19, 1967, Cour d'appel, Paris (Names of parties: Tuilerie de St-
Parres-les-Vaudes c. Ets Guilbert et Laval), [1968] REv. Aiw. 72.
143. Nou. C. PR. CIV. art. 1017 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
144. Id.
145. Decree, supra note 12, art. 13, at 1238.
146. Id. art. 30, at 1239.
147. See P. HERZOG, supra note 11, at 202.
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The previous legislation did not exclude the possibility that
dissenting opinions could be disclosed since the tiers arbitre proce-
dure obliged divided arbitrators to give their separate opinions. Ar-
guably, this disclosure did not violate the principle of secrecy since
the dissenting opinions did not necessarily reveal the actual sub-
stance of the debate that took place, but rather the minority arbi-
trator's findings on the facts and issues.148 The new legislation can
be interpreted as establishing a different rule, one which no longer
permits the parties to have access to dissenting opinions of the ar-
bitrators. Since the deliberations are to be confidential and the re-
sulting award reflects only a majority opinion, the absence of a
statutory provision relating to dissenting opinions seems to have
eliminated altogether the procedure for making public dissenting
views in the arbitral determination.
149
2. Further Assimilation of Arbitral Awards to Court Judgments
In establishing the legal regime governing the arbitral award,
the Decree also borrows from the requirements of article 455 of the
Code de procedure civile, 50 which regulates the content of judicial
decisions. This assimilation of the arbitral proceeding to its judi-
cial counterpart attests to the jurisdictional character of the arbi-
tral award and of the arbitral proceeding from which it results. 51
The Decree requires that the arbitral award elaborate suc-
cinctly the respective allegations and arguments of the parties and,
more importantly, that the arbitral tribunal render a reasoned de-
cision. 52 Although it was well established by court opinions that
arbitral awards, even those rendered by amiables compositeurs
had to be-as a matter of public policy-rendered upon the basis
of a reasoned opinion, 153 the former legislation was completely si-
148. See, Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 195.
149. Id. The secrecy requirement and the possible majoritarian character of awards are
not inconsistent principles. In fact, the possibility of announcing that a decision simply re-
flects the views of a majority of the arbitrators has the advantage of not obliging the dis-
senting arbitrator to invoke article 33(2) and refuse to sign the award. His dissent already
has been recorded, albeit anonymously, and he need not invoke a procedure which reflects a
type of absolute discordance between the majority and the minority arbitrators.
150. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 455 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
151. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 195.
152. Decree, supra note 12, art. 31, at 1239.
153. See Judgment of January 29, 1961, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1961] J.C.P. II No. 12412;
Judgment of October 16, 1962, Cass. civ. d'Aix, [1962] REV. ARB. 144; Judgment of December
12, 1965, [1966] J.C.P. II No. 14625; Judgment of February 6, 1969, Cour d'appel, Paris,
[1969] REV. AlB. 92. See also Judgment of January 25, 1962, Cass. civ. [1963] REV. APB. 89;
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lent on this matter.1 " The Decree also formalizes other rules which
had been followed in practice and continues to align arbitral proce-
dure with its judicial counterpart. Like court judgments, arbitral
awards must now indicate the names of the arbitrators, the date
and place where the award was rendered, the names of the parties,
and the like. Requirements relating to the name of the arbitrators,
the date of the award, and the reasoned character of the award are
mandatory and indispensable to the validity of the award.155
3. Powers of the Arbitrators After the Rendering of the Award
The making of an award renders the arbitrators functus officio
in regard to the dispute.156 Once they have rendered an award,
arbitrators nonetheless retain the power to interpret the award, to
correct the material errors and omissions, and to complete it when
they have failed to rule upon a claim that was presented. 57 These
exceptions to the functus officio principle are subject to the caveat
that, if it is impossible to reconvene the arbitral tribunal, the court
will exercise these powers.158 The new legislation not only codifies
principles which were followed in actual adjudication and were ig-
nored by the antecedent legislation, but also adds the significant
provision that the arbitral tribunal can resume its adjudication if it
failed to rule upon a claim that was presented.159
4. The Article 464 Problem
The incorporation of article 464 of the Civil Procedure Code
into article 35 of the Decree conflicts on its face with the other
provisions of article 35 and must have been due to an oversight on
Judgment of March 17, 1964, [1964] REv. ARB. 127.
154. It should be noted that the failure to produce a reasoned opinion renders the non-
conforming award void. This nullity rule for formal deviations reveals a certain rigor on the
part of the Decree in this regard.
155. Decree, supra note 9, art. 40, at 1239.
156. Id. art. 35, at 1239.
157. Id.
158. Id. The summary character of the previous legislation did not treat these points; it
provided no remedy by which to cure problems which surfaced after an award had been
rendered. However, it was generally recognized that arbitrators could correct material errors
and interpret the award until the time limit (established either by the parties or by the law)
of the arbitration agreement had expired. See J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at M4.
See also Judgment of June 27, 1968, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, [1968] REv. ARE. 109; Judgment of
November 22, 1968, Cass. civ. [1969] REv. ARn. 24. See generally, Perrot, [1969] Rav. ARE. 7.
159. Decree, supra note 12, art. 35, at 1239.
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the part of the drafters.160 Article 464 allows a court to revise its
decisioni if it ruled upon claims which were not presented or if it
made an award beyond the claims which were requested.",e One
could argue that the drafters may have wanted to give the arbitral
tribunal the possibility of repairing its errors, thereby removing
the need to have a party invoke the means of recourse action. Such
a procedure would not only shorten the arbitral process by elimi-
nating the court review of the award on this ground, but would
also give arbitration yet another degree of independence and au-
tonomy from the judiciary.
62
While the language of article 35 does not expressly exclude the
authority to revise an award, it does speak in terms of completing
an award, not revising it. Moreover, if the substance of article 464
were applied in the arbitral context, it would refer to a situation in
which the arbitral tribunal would have exceeded its private juris-
dictional powers rather than failed to exercise them. Its integration
into arbitral jurisprudence, therefore, could have the effect of ex-
tending arbitration beyond its private jurisdictional character. De-
spite the liberal character of the Decree, this breach of the tradi-
tional distinctions between arbitration as a form of private justice
and court action as a form of public justice seems unwarranted.
Moreover, the means of recourse section specifically provides
that an award can be set aside if the arbitral tribunal renders a
ruling beyond its terms of reference. 68 An award, then, should be
set aside and not revised when it rules upon a claim which was not
submitted to the arbitral tribunal. The fact that a court can exer-
cise these powers of revision if the arbitral tribunal cannot be re-
convened is incongruous with the very idea of arbitration. Instead
of setting aside an award for a basic violation of a fundamental
rule, the courts could simply rewrite the award to have it conform
to the provisions of the terms of reference.
The status of the reference to article 464 will be resolved con-
clusively only by future court interpretation. Giving arbitrators the
160. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 195 (upon whose analysis the
author relies in the following discussion).
161. See Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 464 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). See also Robert, Decree Com-
mentary, supra note 9, at 195.
162. The French commentary concludes that the incorporation of article 464 must have
been an oversight without even mentioning the possible advantages of the provision. Again,
a conclusive interpretation of the Decree can only be had by way of future court decisions
which focus upon the issue.
163. Decree, supra note 12, art 44(3), at 1240.
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authority to revise awards obviously would confer an even greater
autonomy upon the arbitral process. Such autonomy, however,
would create too great an imbalance between the principle of con-
tractual autonomy in arbitration and the need for some form of
judicial scrutiny of the private dispute-resolution process. In light
of the general tenor of the Decree and its objectives, the reference
to article 464 should be considered simply as an error.16
5. The Global Impact of Article 35
Despite this problem of interpretation, the substance of article
35 conforms to the underlying policy aims of the new legislation,
strengthening the arbitral process by granting it new powers and
emphasizing its simultaneous autonomy from and similarity to the
judiciary. Despite the private contractual character of their juris-
dictional authority, French arbitral tribunals are assimilated as
closely as possible to the courts, especially in procedural matters.
This assimilation not only reinforces and solidifies the institutional
position of arbitration under French internal law, but also and
more importantly, it clarifies the basic procedural questions left
unanswered by the previous legislation. The official grant of con-
tinuing adjudicatory and emendation powers (limited to claims ac-
tually presented and within the scope of the arbitration but not
ruled upon) attributes a considerable measure of independence to
the arbitral process. Such prerogatives on the part of the arbitra-
tors effectively eliminates many of the minor problems which could
give rise to contention after an award has been rendered." 5 More-
over, it reduces the lapse of time between the rendering and en-
forcement of an award and guarantees that the parties' intention
to have disputes resolved through arbitration will be given full ef-
fect despite relatively minor errors in the process.
In the event that the arbitral tribunal cannot be reconvened to
treat the enumerated matters, the court which would have had ju-
risdiction to hear the dispute in the absence of an arbitration
agreement has the authority to rule upon these questions."6 Once
again, the new legislation does not avoid the question of judicial
intervention in arbitral proceedings, but rather articulates rules
which have the courts act as the indispensable complement to the
164. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 195.
165. Id.
166. Decree, supra note 12, art. 35, at 1239.
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arbitral process. The limited character of the possible judicial in-
tervention provided for in the Decree can be seen only as an act of
cooperation between similar processes. In addition, the generally
liberal attitude of the French courts toward arbitral matters ex-
cludes any form of intervention which could amount to an interfer-
ence with the arbitral process. According to the new legislation, re-
course to the courts before, during, or after the arbitral proceeding
is available only when the sanction of a public authority is neces-
sary to give full legal effect to the arbitration agreement.1 1 7 Under
the express terms of the Decree, the process of arbitration is on a
quasi-equal institutional footing with the judicial process and the
courts are to work hand in hand with arbitral tribunals to give ef-
fect to the parties' intention to arbitrate and to further the princi-
ple of contractual autonomy.
6. The Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Awards
The new legislation also settles the longstanding debate be-
tween the French courts and legal scholars concerning the legal ef-
fects of the award. Previously, while legal scholars argued that an
arbitral award should have res judicata effect (autoritg de la chose
jugge) upon its rendering,"6 8 the French Supreme Court and the
cours d'appel generally ruled that the res judicata effect took
place only after an exequatur had been granted.6 9
The Decree17 0 provides that the arbitral award, once it is ren-
dered by the arbitral tribunal, will have res judicata effect.171 In
order to be legally enforceable, the arbitral award still must be
granted an exequatur from the enforcement judge (juge de
l'ex~cution) of the district court (tribunal de grande instance) in
the jurisdiction of which the award was rendered. These two provi-
sions again evidence the intent to assimilate arbitral awards as
much as possible to the status of court judgments. Since an arbi-
tral award emanates from a tribunal constituted by the private au-
thority of individuals, it cannot have the coercive force of a deci-
sion rendered by a court of law. Nonetheless, the award represents
167. Id. arts. 4 & 14, at 1238; id. arts. 16 & 17, 23, at 1239.
168. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
169. See text accompanying note 137 supra. See also Riotte, Decree Commentary,
supra note 12, at 9 (citing Judgment of July 6, 1971, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1971] D. Jur.
164).
170. Decree, supra note 12, art. 36, at 1239.
171. Id. art. 37, at 1239.
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a definitive ruling upon the controversy that was voluntarily
brought before the tribunal by private individuals. Once an award
is made, the specific dispute upon which it rules is not to be reliti-
gated, except to the extent that the means of recourse imply a re-
hearing of the matter.
7. The Decision Denying an Exequatur
The Decree 172 requires that a judicial decision denying an exe-
quatur to an arbitral award must be based upon a reasoned opin-
ion. Previously, the state of the law on this point was not abso-
lutely clear. 17 3 Seemingly, the drafters of the Decree wanted to give
arbitral awards every chance of enforcement by having a court,
which created obstacles to the process, outline the reasons for its
action, thereby giving the prejudiced party clear grounds upon
which to bring an appeal. This requirement applies despite the fact
that the enforcement proceeding is a nonadversarial, ex parte ac-
tion; its purpose remains clear to allow the disappointed party suf-
ficient grounds upon which to appeal the decision denying the en-
forcement order. Despite the clarity of its logic and purpose, this
provision contains a potential problem of implementation which
may encourage the recourse to dilatory tactics.
17 4
The appeal of a court decision denying an exequatur to an
arbitral award lies for a period of one month after notice of it has
been given (la signification).7 5 This appeal involves a considera-
tion of the arguments on both sides. In ordinary circumstances, no-
tice of the decision denying an exequatur should be given to the
party against whom it was rendered under the two-fold assumption
that the losing party is the one who is less likely to be aware of the
decision, and that the underlying rationale of the notice require-
ment is to protect the interest of the losing party in exercising his
right of appeal.
The exequatur proceeding for an arbitral award, however, is
not analogous to the ordinary situation. On the one hand, the pro-
172. Id. art. 38(2), at 1239.
173. See J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at N3. See also Judgment of December
5, 1963, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1964] D. Jur. 503, [1964] REv. ARB. 15, [1964] J.C.P. H No.
13481; Judgment of January 22, 1954, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1955] D. Jur. 335, [1955] REV.
ARB. 18; Judgment of January 12, 1937, [1937], 14 Recueil Dalloz Hebdomedaire [D. Heb.]
138.
174. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 196 (upon which the author
relies in the following discussion).
175. Decree, supra note 12, art. 49, at 1239.
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ceeding is an ex parte action; only the party requesting an enforce-
ment order need be present before the court and the ordinance of
the court deciding on the enforcement question is the result of a
non-adversarial (non-contradictoire) proceeding. On the other
hand, the party against whom the award was rendered need not be
present; the proceeding is not a setting in which he can present his
substantive arguments against the award.
When a court denies enforceability to an award, its decision
favors the interests of the party against whom the award was ren-
dered (in this setting, the absent party) and rejects the motion of
the requesting party (who is present). The requesting party has de
facto notice of the decision, but the non-requesting party may not
have such notice, either de facto or de jure. Under the usual appli-
cation of the notice procedure, the party in whose favor the deci-
sion was rendered has the responsibility of serving notice of the
decision rendered. This rule would have the bizarre result of re-
quiring the party whose request for an exequatur was denied to
serve notice of that decision upon the party against whom the
award was rendered so that the latter party could serve him, in
turn, with notice of the exequatur decision, permitting him to ex-
ercise his right of appeal. The literal and technical application of
this procedure, which is seemingly required by the provisions of
the Decree, could become a fertile source of dilatory tactics on the
part of the party against whom the award was rendered.
Of course, only future practice will determine how this provi-
sion is actually used and applied. Nonetheless, it remains a proce-
dural reality of perhaps some, albeit limited, consequence. In ac-
tual practice, a decision refusing an exequatur to an award should
be something of a rarity and the notice problem insignificant. The
exequatur judge can refuse enforceability to an arbitral award only
when it becomes apparent from a very limited and superficial scru-
tiny of the award that it violates strong public policy concerns (or-
dre public apparent). The notice procedure implied in the article
38 requirement points only to the possibility of theoretical
problems. While no appeal lies from an affirmative decision grant-
ing enforceability to the award, the means of recourse procedure
can be invoked against the award itself once the award is rendered
or within one month after the award has been granted an
exequatur.
176
176. Id. art. 38 at 1239; id. art. 46, at 1240.
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8. Other Provisions
The remaining rules" contained in this section either restate
the substance of the repealed provisions or affirm principles fol-
lowed in actual arbitral practice which were absent in the previous
legislative text. As before,117 the legal provisions relating to the
provisional enforcement of court judgments can be applied to arbi-
tral awards.""9 This provision can be useful in circumstances in
which the creditor of the award wants to avoid the dilatory tactics
of the debtor party who invokes a means of recourse action against
the award only to gain enough time to file a petition in bank-
ruptcy.180 The provisional enforcement of an award acts as a guar-
antee to a creditor who is awaiting the final decision of a court on
the award."" The Decree contains more specific rules relating to
the effect of the means of recourse when provisional enforcement
has been granted and when means of recourse have been invoked
requesting the provisional enforcement of the award. The Decree
thereby achieves a coordination between these two procedures.'8 2
177. Id. arts. 33, 34, 38(1), 39, & 40, at 1239.
178. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 1024 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). See also J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU,
supra note 5, at S1 (sources cited).
179. Decree, supra note 12, art. 39, at 1239.
180. See Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 11.
181. Id.
182. Decree, supra note 12, art. 39(2), at 1239. The substance of article 39(2) confirms
the holdings of previous judicial decisions on this question. Although these decisions related
to the former means of recourse actions which were available against arbitral awards, the
courts had held that the provisional enforcement granted to arbitral awards should be
respected (as for court judgments) even though a means of recourse action had been invoked
against the award. See Judgment of April 12, 1948, Cass. civ. com., [1948] S. Jur. I 96,
[1948] GAZ. PALAIS I 244; Judgment of April 18, 1948, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1949] S. Jur. II
17; Judgment of February 27, 1952, Cour d'appel, Besancon, [1954] D. Jur. 733. The provi-
sional enforcement of an award could be suspended or attacked in certain exceptional cir-
cumstances. See Judgment of February 27, 1952, Cour d'appel, Besancon, [1954] D. Jur.
733; Judgment of March 18, 1948, Cour d'appel, Paris [1949] S. Jur. II 17. See generally J.
ROBERT AND B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at S1. Article 39(2) of the Decree confirms the basic
rules established by this jurisprudence and coordinates them with the new means of re-
course procedure. Its more detailed provisions represent an improvement over the former
legislation. Finally, it aligns the procedure which it prescribes with the provisions of the civil
procedure code relating to the provisional, enforcement of judgments, namely, articles 525
and 526 of that code. The substance of article 39(2), therefore, is in keeping with the basic
thrust of the Decree. Decree, supra note 12, art. 33, at 1239. For the substance of the previ-
ous law on this subject which is identical to the new provision, see Nou. C. PR. CIV. art. 1016
(Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). See also Judgment of March 24, 1960, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1960]
REV. ARB. 50; Judgment of February 12, 1963, [1967] J.C.P. II No. 13281. Decree, supra note
12, art. 40, at 1239.
[Vol. 4
French Arbitration Law
9. Ruling According to Substantive Legal Rules
The new legislation also provides that the arbitrators will rule
in accordance with the rules of law,183 unless the parties have au-
thorized them to rule as amiables compositeurs, a status which al-
lows them to disregard legal rules if they so choose and to resolve
the dispute according to equitable considerations. 184 This provision
should be contrasted with the substance of the previous article
which provides that the arbitral tribunal will not be held to follow
the procedural rules established for the courts.
18 5
Such a requirement guarantees the seriousness of arbitral de-
cisions 1 6 despite the benefit of a flexible arbitral process. Accord-
ingly, commercial parties who have submitted disputes involving
large sums of money to arbitration can have the merits of the dis-
pute resolved according to established principles of law. This pro-
vision should relieve (and was perhaps designed to relieve) appre-
hensions that the arbitral tribunal would engage in haphazard or
purely arbitrary adjudication. The parties have the benefit of a
merits ruling which is anchored in the consistency, predictability,
and relative certainty provided by established legal rules.
The reassurance proffered by article 34, however, may be Uilu-
sory. The fact that the arbitrators usually are technical experts
(actually selected for this reason) and not professional judges obvi-
ously will lead them to interpret the relevant legal principles ac-
cording to their professional bent and to season their interpreta-
tion of these principles with a pinch (or two) of their business
experience, and their knowledge of the customs and usages of the
trade. Moreover, in a system where the doctrine of stare decisis
has meager official currency, court decisions (in theory) have little
183. Decree, supra note 12, art. 34, at 1239. Previously, although the former legislation
did not contain a specific provision on this point, it was generally recognized that the arbi-
trators were held to rule according to the rules of law which applied in court actions. The
Decree, then, merely codified the rule which was observed in practice. See J. ROBERT & B.
MOREAU, supra note 5, at H9. See also Judgment of February 4, 1966, Cour d'appel, Paris,
[1966] RE v. ARM. 27.
184. When arbitrators are authorized by the parties to rule as amiables compositeurs,
they can disregard legal principles and render a ruling upon the basis of equitable consider-
ations or according to their own convictions. SEE J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at
H9. See also Judgment of June 6, 1887, Cass. civ., [1888] Recueil Dalloz priodique et cri-
tique I [D.P. I] 132; Judgment of January 7, 1963, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1963] REV. ARB. 21,
[1968] 1 GAz. PALAIS 435.
185. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
186. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 195; Riotte, Decree Commen-
tary, supra note 12, at 11.
No. 2]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
weight in the formulation of law; the same perception of decisional
law would apply even more forcefully to arbitral awards. In other
words, there would be little institutional concern about how arbi-
tral tribunals apply, interpret, or otherwise read the established
principles of law in a particular dispute submitted to arbitration
except where strong public policy concerns are involved.
The role that is afforded to appeal and the general means of
recourse procedure that is available against arbitral awards illus-
trate even more clearly the ambiguity and perhaps restrained
meaning of the article 34 provisions in the arbitration context. The
right of appeal which can be invoked against arbitral awards in-
volves a de novo consideration of the facts and the law. Since a
court, under this procedure, can rewrite the arbitral decision com-
pletely on appeal, the procedure, in effect, provides the parties to
an arbitration with the guarantee that the dispute will be resolved
according to the established rules of law. However, if appellate re-
view were invoked regularly, there would be little incentive to have
recourse to arbitration initially since the ultimate decision on the
matter would be taken by professional judges and not expert lay-
men. Consequently, in the vast majority of arbitration agreements
the parties waive their right to appeal, and rely upon more limited
means of recourse to invoke a more restrained form of judicial
scrutiny. The means of recourse cannot be invoked upon grounds
directly relating to the arbitral tribunal's application of the law;
instead remedies are provided in cases involving technical viola-
tions of basic procedural provisions, failure to respect mandatory
requirements for the award, and violations of strong public policy
considerations. In short, the question of whether the arbitral tribu-
nal correctly applied the established rules of law to the dispute
escapes the scrutiny of the courts. It is therefore probable that
these established principles will have a markedly different texture
when applied by arbitrators rather than by professional judges.
Additionally, the former legislation and the Decree both ex-
clude the possibility that appeal (pourvoi en cassation) can be
made directly from an arbitral award to the French Supreme
Court. The chief task of the French Supreme Court is to assure the,
uniform application of the law by the lower courts; an appeal to
the highest private law court can be made only upon a question of
law. The decisions of arbitral tribunals specifically escape this form
of scrutiny. Thus, arbitrators have a measure of freedom in deter-
mining and applying the applicable legal principles. Judicial deci-
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sions relating to arbitral awards, of course, can be the subject of an
appeal to the French Supreme Court, but it seems that the ques-
tion of law submitted to the court would deal with the lower
court's application of the French law on arbitration rather than
with the way in which the arbitral tribunal selected and applied
substantive legal principles.
Finally, since arbitration is a form of private contractual jus-
tice done by lay experts and subject primarily to the scrutiny of
the courts on procedural matters and basic public policy grounds,
many arbitral decisions remain unpublished. Even journals special-
izing in arbitration report only the court decisions dealing with ar-
bitration cases. The specific jurisprudence of the arbitral tribu-
nals, then, is completely outside the mainstream of the evolution of
the formal case law dealing with the established legal principles.
Despite its practical importance and the possible innovations it
could create in the interpretaton of law, it is an area of adjudica-
tion which goes officially unnoticed.
That arbitral decisions must be rendered according to the
rules of law does not guarantee the parties that they will have the
equivalent of a court-rendered merits ruling. Such expectations,
which can be drawn from the literal language of article 34, are un-
realistic; the meaning of the article must be qualified by taking
into account the realities of the arbitral process. The arbitrators
will apply the substantive principles of law to the dispute, but they
will do so within and according to their particular competence and
experience. The parties did not bargain for any more than this.
10. The Amiable Composition Problem
The article 34 rule does not apply when the parties, in their
arbitration agreement, have conferred the status of amiable com-
positeur upon the arbitrators.18 7 One French commentator, Maitre
Robert, maintains that the Decree provides that the parties will be
deemed to have conferred the status of amiable compositeur upon
arbitrators if, in their arbitration agreement, they have waived
their right to de novo appeal. 188 In his estimation, the substance of
this provision is justified because in actual arbitral practice, the
parties often provide for this effect, i.e., the waiver of the right to
appeal carries with it the parties' desire that the arbitrators rule as
187. Decree, supra note 12, art. 34, at 1239.
188. Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 195.
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amiables compositeurs. Maitre Robert further argues that those
parties who wish to waive their right of appeal and have the arbi-
trators render a ruling based on legal principles need only so spec-
ify this in their agreement. 18 9 According to this interpretation, the
general rule articulated in article 34, providing that the arbitrators
rule on the merits according to the rules of law, would not apply in
cases in which the parties to the arbitration have waived their
right to appeal since the arbitrators impliedly rule as amiables
compositeurs.
There is nothing particularly objectionable about this inter-
pretation. 90 It has the evident systemic consequence that few arbi-
tral decisions will be based upon established rules of law. Given
the prior considerations relating to the arbitrators' probable use of
these rules, the result does not seem unacceptable. The substantive
basis upon which this interpretation is anchored, however, is some-
what enigmatic. Since the express language of article 34 neither
mentions nor implies such a possibility, the statement must be
based upon a reading of another article of the Decree; the most
likely candidate is article 42. This provision states that: (1) the ar-
bitral award is subject to appeal unless the parties have waived
their right to appeal in the arbitration agreement; and (2) the
award is not subject to appeal when the arbitrator has been given
the authority to rule as an amiable compositeur, unless the parties
have expressly reserved their right to appeal in the arbitration
agreement. 191 On appeal, the court will rule in an amiable composi-
tion capacity if the arbitrator had this status. 92
These are the only. provisions of the Decree which are directly
relevant to the question under consideration; they neither ex-
pressly nor impliedly support the view that the waiver of appeal
implies that the parties have given the arbitrators the authority to
rule as amiables compositeurs. As a general rule, article 42 estab-
189. Id.
190. Apparently, a similar proposal had been considered by the commission for the re-
form of civil procedure. Under this proposal, which was in draft form, arbitrators would
have been deemed by law, as a general rule, to have the status of amiables compositeurs
and have the capacity to rule according to equitable considerations. Only an express stipula-
tion by the parties to the contrary could defeat this general rule. The proposal, however,
never was adopted in light of the concern that it raised among legislators especially in re-
gard to its implications upon international arbitration matters. See Written Question No.
27884., J.O. January 18, 1979 (Sen. Debates), at 168.




lishes that appeal lies against arbitral awards, subject to certain
exceptions noted in the preceding paragraph. If the parties give the
arbitrators the authority to rule as amiables compositeurs, this im-
plies a waiver of appeal. The latter presumption of waiver can be
rebutted by an express stipulation to the contrary in the arbitra-
tion agreement. Article 43 covers the exceptional case in which the
parties have maintained their right to appeal and given the arbi-
trators the status of amiables compositeurs by providing that the
appeals court also can rule according to equitable considerations.
There appears to be nothing in these provisions which con-
firms the theory advanced between the waiver of appeal and the
conferring of the status of amiable compositeur upon the arbitra-
tors, at least not in terms of cause and effect. While it is clear that
the status of amiable compositeur implies a waiver of appeal (as a
rebuttable presumption), the converse is not necessarily true.
Under the terms of the Decree, the waiver of appeal seems to be
quite independent of any intention of the parties to confer the sta-
tus of amiable compositeur upon the arbitral tribunal. In theory at
least, it is possible that parties might waive their right to judicial
appeal of the award in order to avoid a de novo consideration of
the dispute by a court and thereby to preserve the viability of their-
initial recourse to arbitration. At the same time, the parties may
intend to have the arbitrators rule according to legal principles in
order to provide traditional substantive structure to the arbitral
discussions and deliberations. The Robert interpretation seems to
reflect certain axioms of arbitral practice and it may well be
adopted by future courts construing the Decree. Nonetheless, the
express language of the Decree and the logic of the syntactical or-
dering of article 43, do not, on their face, accomodate this interpre-
tation with great ease.
VII. REMEDIAL PROCEDURE FOR
CHALLENGING ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE
MEANS OF RECOURSE
Under the previously applicable legislation, 193 the means of re-
course (les voies de recours) that could be invoked to obtain the
judicial review of arbitral awards were numerous and overlapped to
some extent. The terminology used to describe these various ac-
193. Nou. C. P& civ. arts. 1022-28 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
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tions itself led to some confusion,"" and, while there was a multi-
plicity of remedies, they 'ould be invoked only under certain con-
ditions and upon fairly narrow grounds.195 The remedial panoply
involved an intricate procedure, and the astute party who wanted
to defeat the enforceability of an award at all costs could at least
create delay by combining certain of the remedies into a solid web
of procedural opposition. The penultimate title of the Decree con-
tains the final substantive provisions on arbitration; its purpose is
to reformulate the rules relating to the means of recourse proce-
dure and, in effect, to unify and simplify the remedies and their
procedural implementation. 198 While an improvement unquestion-
ably has been achieved, the modifications that have been intro-
duced may fall short of reaching the desired goal.
A. The Previous Regime
An assessment of the Decree reforms first requires a descrip-
tion and an evaluation of the antecedent regime. It should be
noted at the outset of this description that the exequatur proceed-
ing itself (invoked to obtain the legal enforceability of the award)
was not, and still is not, envisaged in the French system as a proce-
dure for obtaining the judicial review of arbitral awards. 19 In this
ex parte and non-adversarial proceeding, the exequatur judge had
and continues to have only limited authority. The judge merely
can ascertain whether the arbitral award satisfies on its face the
most basic public policy requirements.1 98
194. See P. HERZOG, supra note 11, at 530.
195. See, e.g., Nou. C. P. cwv. art. 1028 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
196. Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 189, 196.
197. P. HE oo, supra note 11, at 531, n.285.
198. J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at N2-N3. See also Judgment of May 25,
1962, Cass. civ., [1962] REv. Aim. 103 (the enforcement order granted by the court does not
have a litigous character (caracthre contentieux) since its purpose is not to resolve or render
a ruling in a dispute); Judgment of July 4, 1968, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1968] REv. APB. 105
(the judge sitting in an enforcement matter does not rule upon the merits of the dispute and
the latter is not taken into consideration in his decision regarding the granting of an en-
forcement order-unless it refers to strong public policy matters). See generally Judgment
of July 30, 1952, Cass. civ., [1952] D. Jur. 724; Judgment of October 16, 1962, Cour d'appel,
d'Aix, [1962] J.C.P, II No. 12923; Judgment of May 8, 1967, Cour d'appel, Seine, [1967] Ray.
Am. 77; Judgment of July 4, 1968, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1968] R.v. ARB. 105; Boulbs, Sen-





Under the now-repealed articles of the Nouveau Code de pro-
c~dure civile, opposition (a remedy by which a party in default
could obtain a reopening of the case) was not available in arbitra-
tion matters. The parties to an arbitration proceeding, which usu-
ally was instituted upon their mutual request, were never deemed
to be in default.199
2. Pourvoi
Moreover, no appeal could be made directly from an arbitral
award to the French Supreme Court.20 In effect, only judicial
judgments dealing with arbitral matters could be the subject of a
pourvoi.201 Under this form of appeal, the Supreme Court usually
would review only the lower court's application of domestic law,
and not the legal reasoning and the legal conclusions reached by
the arbitral tribunal. 2
3. Appel-r6formation
A general appeal, known as appel-r~formation and lodged
before the relevant cour d'appel,203 involving a de novo considera-
tion of the case, 204 did lie against arbitral awards, provided the
parties had not waived their right to de novo appeal205 or implied
the same206 by authorizing the arbitrators to rule as amiables corn-
positeurs.207 In actual practice, since the parties by agreeing to ar-
199. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 1016(3) (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). See also P. HERZOG, supra note
11, at 531.
200. Nou. C. PR. cv. art. 1028(s) (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). See also P. HERZOG, supra note
11, at 533.
201. P. HERZOG, supra note 11, at 533.
202. Id. at 533.
203. Nou. C. PR. civ. art 1023 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
204. P. HERZOG, supra note 11, at 532.
205. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 1010 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
206. Id. art. 1019.
207. P. HERZOG, supra note 11, at 532. The Decree basically maintained this rule by
providing that an arbitral award could not be subject to appeal when the arbitrators are
authorized to rule as amiables compositeurs unless the parties have expressly reserved this
possibility in their agreement. See Decree, supra note 12, art. 42, 1239. The Ministry of
Justice has defined amiable composition as a status which does not prohibit the arbitrators
from ruling according to law, but rather it gives them the possibility of disregarding legal
rules relating to the merits and the procedure which are not of an imperative or public
policy character which appear to be overly rigorous and contrary to equity. See Written
Question No. 27844, supra note 190.
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bitrate intended to remove the dispute from the jurisdiction of the
courts, they usually waived their right to the judicial appeal of the
award, thereby preventing the courts from reconsidering the entire
case anew.20 8 Under the former article of the Civil Procedure
Code,209 parties to a compromis could waive their right to appeal,
and this prerogative had been extended by court interpretation to
parties to a compromissory clause.210
4. Appel-nullitg
Despite a waiver of the right to de novo appeal (of appel-rf-
ormation), the parties still had a number of remedial options avail-
able. The courts, in true pretorian fashion, had devised another
form of appeal, appel-nullitg, which could be invoked despite a
waiver of the right to judicial appeal. This form of recourse was
created as a supplementary action designed to cover instances in
which there was an alleged violation of strong public policy (ordre
public). Appel-nullit could be invoked in the following circum-
stances: (1) when the arbitral tribunal had failed to include certain
substantive considerations (e.g., the subject matter of the dispute
or the arguments of the parties) in the award; (2) when the award
was not rendered upon the basis of a reasoned decision; (3) when
there had been a violation of the principle that judgments be ren-
dered only after full argument on both sides (principe de la con-
tradiction) or of basic defense rights (droits de la defense); and (4)
when there otherwise had been a direct violation of a strong public
policy rule.
The appel-nulliO action essentially was a remedial procedure
of tertiary importance; it functioned as a backdrop to the other
means of recourse. When de novo appeal had been waived and the
other two applicable means of recourse were available and covered
the alleged grounds for challenge, the appel-nullitg could not be
invoked. If successful, however, the appel-nullitg would result in
the partial or total annulment of the award. It was not clear from
the case law whether the court then had the authority to render a
new ruling on the merits. Usually, in these circumstances, the par-
ties would either litigate the dispute before a lower court or initi-
ate a new arbitral proceeding.
208. See, e.g., J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5 at Q1.
209. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 1010 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
210. Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 8.
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5. Opposition en nullitg
The opposition en nullitg was perhaps the means of recourse
most frequently invoked against arbitral awards.21  This action was
a special remedy which the legislature created especially for arbi-
tration; it had nothing to do with default and was totally distinct
from opposition.212 The action could be invoked only upon a lim-
ited number of grounds. The restrictive character of these grounds,
outlined in the Civil Procedure Code, reflected a legislative policy
of affording parties a certain amount of protection against the
most salient potential abuses of the arbitral process while limiting
the reach of that court protection because of the contractual na-
ture of arbitration. 13
Under this procedure, a party could attack the validity of the
enforcement order because of a procedural defect in the award it-
self. Some examples of these procedural defects include: (1) if the
award were rendered in the absence of a compromis (submission)
or outside the terms of the submission; (2) if it were rendered upon
the basis of a void or expired submission; (3) it it were rendered by
arbitrators who were not authorized to rule in the absence of other
arbitrators; (4) if it were rendered by a tiers arbitre who failed to
confer with the two divided arbitrators; and (5) if it went beyond
the terms of the submission. 14 The opposition en nullit applied
both to awards that had been rendered according to the rules of
law and awards rendered by arbitrators sitting as amiables com-
positeurs. It was conducted as an ordinary action brought against
the exequatur of the award before the court that had rendered the
award enforceable.1 5
6. General Features of the Former Remedial Actions
It appears that, in an appropriate case, an award could be
challenged upon the basis of both appel-nullitg and opposition en
nullitg if the award violated both a public policy rule and a techni-
cal procedural requirement relating specifically to arbitration. 216
211. See, e.g., J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at P1.
212. P. HERZOG, supra note 11, at 531.
213. See, e.g., J. ROBERT & B. MoREAU, supra note 5, at P1.
214. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 1028 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
215. P. HERzOO, supra note 11, at 531. See also Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 1028(7) (Dalloz 72d
ed. 1979).
216. On this question, see Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 196-97; Riotte,
Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 13.
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Obviously, this could make the choice of the appropriate remedy
difficult and lead to two separate yet concurrent legal actions
against the same award before different courts. What was perhaps
a lesser problem, which could still arise, was that some of the
grounds under the opposition en nullitg could be interpreted as
involving public policy and, therefore, as being duplicative of the
grounds for invoking appel-nullit& This made the choice between
remedial options even more difficult.
As a general rule, however, there was a hierarchical ordering
among the available remedies when the right to de novo appeal
(appel-r~formation) had been waived. As a consequence, when the
grounds for challenging an award were covered by the provisions of
all three remedial options-appel-nullitg, opposition and recours
en revision (to be discussed, infra), the opposition en nullitg usu-
ally controlled. This general rule, however, was not followed con-
sistently in practice by parties anxious to preserve all of their legal
rights and seeking to oppose the enforceability of an award upon
all available grounds nor by parties simply wanting to create delay
in the enforcement process. 211 Admittedly, the distinction between
these remedies was not entirely clear and led at times to considera-
ble confusion.
In regard to other features of these actions,21 a waiver of op-
position was not possible (at least before the award had been ren-
dered) since it was deemed to be a strong public policy provision.
It could be waived, however, after the award had been rendered,
and such a waiver was implied in the fact that the parties volunta-
rily complied with the award or the legal enforcement of the latter
was unopposed. Presumably, the appel-nullitg action could not be
waived either, since it related expressly to strong public policy con-
cerns. Nonetheless, the resort to this remedy was within the discre-
tion of the parties and could be effective only when the parties
actually brought such an action before the courts. Moreover, it
seems that, when there was a flagrant violation of public policy,
the party against whom the award was rendered would not hesitate
to demand judicial scrutiny if such an action favored his interests.
It should be emphasized that both of these means of recourse
could be invoked only when the award had been granted an exe-





had been given to the other party. These actions resulted, as a gen-
eral rule, in the setting aside of an award and not in a new court
ruling on the merits.219
7. Recours en revision and requite civile
Finally, the parties could invoke the recours en revision ac-
tion220 to have an arbitral award reviewed again upon certain speci-
fied grounds. This action, formerly called the requite civile,221 was
brought before the competent court of appeal, and was invoked to
obtain relief in circumstances in which there had been some form
of fraud during the arbitral proceeding.22 2 The action could be in-
voked only when the requesting party, through no fault of his own,
had been unable to make these claims before the award had been
given res judicata effect. The purpose of the action was to have
the award set aside and to have the court render a new ruling on
the merits of the dispute (usually not involving any additional evi-
dence gathering (instruction) or relitigation), 28 In light of the ex-
ceptional grounds upon which this procedure could be invoked, its
limited substantive scope, and the fact that it would lead to a judi-
cial ruling on the merits, the recours en revision was not often in-
voked in arbitral matters.2
Its predecessor, the requite civile,2 5 also played a limited role
in arbitral matters. The requite civile could be invoked upon
grounds similar to those f&r the recours en revision, i.e., when the
award was based upon evidence which was subsequently found to
be false or intentionally undisclosed and upon other grounds (e.g.,
the failure to respect mandatory forms when the parties had not
waived this requirement). 26
Since these grounds were provided for in the opposition en
nullitg,227 the requite civile became a rarity and essentially ac-
quired the status of a paper remedy.128 Moreover, not only was the
remedy available only when the right to de novo appeal had been
219. Id.
220. Nou. C. PP_ civ. art. 1026 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
221. J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at 01-02.
222. Nou. C. PP_ civ. art. 1026(2) (Daloz 72d ed. 1979).
223. Id. arts. 593 & 595.
224. See P. HERzOG, supra note 11, at 533.
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waived, but also the right to resort to the action (except in a case
of personal fraud) could be waived by the parties at the outset of
an arbitral proceeding or thereafter. 29 In addition, a fairly intri-
cate procedure accompanied the action which, at least in theory,
could result both in the setting aside of the award and a new court
ruling on the merits.30 In this sense, the requite civile was similar
to its successor, the recours en revision, but in both cases no one
attachea much importance to the possibility of a judicial ruling on
the merits since neither action was invoked very frequently.
2 1
8. Tierce opposition
In addition to the usual host of remedies, a form of challenge,
known as the tierce opposition, was available to third parties. Al-
though there was some debate upon this question, 3 2 this remedy
was available despite the fact that former article 1022 of the Civil
Procedure Code provided that arbitral awards could not be
brought against third parties. In regular proceedings, tierce oppo-
sition consisted of a challenge by a third party to a judgment
which resulted from an action to which he was not a party but
which nonetheless prejudiced his rights. By invoking this action,
the third party could obtain a reopening of the matter. In the arbi-
tration context, tierce opposition was brought before the district
court that had the authority to grant an exequatur (the tribunal
de grande instance). It usually was invoked by creditors whose in-
terests had been affected by a collusively obtained award.23 3 In ac-
tual practice, this form of third-party opposition was invoked
chiefly against foreign arbitral awards and was of limited utility in
the domestic arbitral context.23
B. The Purpose of the New Legislation
The purported aim of the new legislation was to simplify the
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Nou. C. PR. civ. arts. 593-603 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979). See also P. HERZOG, supra
note 11, at 533-34, n. 306.
232. P. HERZOG, supra note 11, at 534. The debate on this question arose as a result of
the fact that article 1022 of the Code de procedure civile provided that arbitral awards
could not be brought against third parties; it was argued that this provision excluded the
remedy of tierce opposition. This argument, however, represented a minority position.
233. Id.
234. Id. See also J. ROBERT & B. MoRxAu, supra note 5, at Ri.
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means of recourse procedure and to arrive at a semblance of unity
among the various remedial options.235 Its principal innovations
consist of having all of the means of recourse actions brought at
the same appellate level, creating essentially a bifurcated means of
recourse system, and combining the grounds contained previously
in several actions into one remedy.236
1. Appeal
The new legislation maintains the principle that arbitral
awards are subject to de novo appeal, and also that parties have
the prerogative of waiving their right to judicial appeal of the
award in their agreement.23 7 This statement of the traditional law
has been given new meaning and functions as the central organiz-
ing principle of the reform. Rather than have a multiplicity of
sometimes duplicative remedies,23 8 the new legislation provides for
a dual system of recourse premised upon whether the parties have
retained their right to judicial appeal.
When the parties have maintained their right to de novo ap-
peal, the Decree provides that lodging an appeal is the only means
of recourse available against an arbitral award either to obtain re-
versal and revision of the award, or to have it annulled or set
aside.23 ' In other words, when the right to de novo appeal is main-
tained, the parties advance all their arguments for a new merits
decision or to have the award simply set aside.24 0 In applying this
provision, the courts will probably give preference to the less dras-
tic remedy if it actually does lead to having the award set aside.
This procedure, however, will not prejudice the rights of the par-
ties to a judicial ruling on the merits since the recours en annula-
tion can result in that type of ruling in any case.2 41
2. Recours en annulation
In the event that the parties have waived their right to de
novo appeal, they can avail themselves of the recours en annula-
235. See text accompanying notes 193-196, supra.
236. Nonetheless, a court decision denying a request for an exequatur, which must be
reasoned (motive), is subject to appeal.
237. Decree, supra note 12, art. 42, J.O. at 1239.
238. See text accompanying notes 199-234 supra.
239. Decree, supra note 12, art. 43, at 1239.
240. Id.
241. Id. art. 45, at 1240.
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tion remedy (the action for cancellation or setting aside the award)
against the award despite any stipulations in their agreement to
the contrary.2 42 Seemingly, this gives an ordre public status to this
action. In any event, since it cannot be waived by the agreement of
the parties, this action assures that some form of judicial scrutiny
will be given to arbitral awards when de novo appeal does not ap-
ply. This procedure essentially combines the grounds that were
formerly available under the article 1028 action, the opposition en
nullitg, and the appel-nullitg action and may be invoked only in
the following circumstances: (1) if the arbitrator ruled in the ab-
sence of an arbitration agreement or upon the basis of a void or
expired agreement; (2) if the arbitral tribunal was irregularly con-
stituted or the sole arbitrator irregularly nominated; (3) if the arbi-
trator did not rule in accordance with the terms of reference that
were given to him; (4) when the principle that judgments be given
after full argument on both sides (principe de la contradiction)
was not respected; (5) in all cases of nullity provided for in article
40 of the Decree which relates to the requirement of a reasoned
decision and that the award contain the names of the arbitrators,
be dated, and signed by all the arbitrators; and, finally, (6) if the
arbitrator violated a public policy rule.2
43
3. The Effect of Amiable Composition
The Decree provides that, when the parties have given the ar-
bitrators the status of amiables compositeurs, that stipulation im-
plies a waiver of de novo appeal, unless the parties have expressly
provided to the contrary.244 On this matter, the Decree essentially
confirms the validity of a rule that had been articulated previously
by the courts.245 In the event that the parties have authorized the
arbitrators to rule as amiables compositeurs, and expressly re-
tained their right to appeal, the court which hears this appeal will
rule in an amiable composition capacity.2 46 This provision is quite
new and important;24 7 it reflects the substance of the recent deci-
sions of the Cour d'appel of Paris, interpreting article 12(3) of the
Civil Procedure Code which allows parties in an ordinary court ac-
242. Id. art. 44, at 1240.
243. Id.
244. Id. art. 42, at 1239.
245. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 196 (sources cited in n. 12).
246. Decree, supra note 12, art. 43, at 1239.
247. See Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 196.
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tion to authorize the court to rule in an amiable composition ca-
pacity.24 18 This rule applies only in cases in which the parties have
maintained their right of appeal. The grounds that can be invoked
under the recours en annulation action are strictly legal grounds
and cannot be judged in equity.24 9 This application of this rule will
also have the effect of eliminating the pourvoi en cassation, at
least in regard to questions of law but probably not in regard to
the requirement that the arbitral award satisfy mandatory
forms. 250 Thus, the implementation of this provision is likely to fall
short of its promise. While the courts have the authority to rule in
equity in these circumstances, they are likely to remain true to the
reasoning and legal principles they apply in traditional court ac-
tions. The rule, then, may be of only limited utility and gain its
importance only in circumstances in which law and equity would
lead to contrary results. Here, the court might use its new author-
ity to give preference to equitable considerations.5 1
4. The Possibility of a Merits Ruling by the Court
When the court before which the recours en annulation is
brought annuls, (or sets aside) the arbitral award, that court then
rules upon the .merits of the dispute within the limitations of the
arbitrators' terms of reference, unless all the parties express a con-
trary intention.2 2 This provision should be regarded as the most
far-reaching and audacious article in the Decree. In effect, it em-
powers a court of law, in certain limited circumstances, to act in
the same capacity as the arbitral tribunal chosen by the parties.
Some commentators 253 have advanced the view that the underlying
rationale of this provision stems from the fact that it will dissuade
parties from invoking the recours en annulation to a dilatory end.
Since the setting aside of an award can result in a merits ruling by
the court, a party will presumably think twice before invoking that
action.
This explanation, however, does not seem to square with the
reality of dilatory practices. Usually, the party against whom the




251. See Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 14.
252. Decree, supra note 12, art. 45, at 1240.
253. See, e.g., Robert, Decree Commentary, supra note 9, at 197.
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award was rendered and who knows that the award is valid will
invoke the recours en annulation. In these circumstances, the
award will not be set aside and, therefore, the justification ad-
vanced for the merits ruling by the court simply is not persuasive.
Other commentators 254 have described this provision as "very orig-
inal and interesting," asserting that the courts are well placed at
this stage of the process to render a ruling on the merits. In their
opinion, it is more economical to have a final decision at this point
than to initiate a new arbitral procedure. This positive assessment,
however, ends with the statement that the parties' attachment to
arbitration probably will lead them to agree that a judicial ruling
on the merits is not warranted even at this late stage of the pro-
cess.255 Whether this provision will have a beneficial or negative
impact upon French domestic arbitration can only be answered
with certainty in future arbitral practice. Its innovative character,
both in isolation and in conjunction with the other provisions of
the Decree, justifies some speculation as to its likely impact and
function in the arbitral adjudication.
Article 45 in effect establishes a rebuttable presumption that
the court which sets aside an arbitral award in a recours en annu-
lation action will then rule upon the merits of the dispute origi-
nally submitted to arbitration. This presumption can be rebutted
only when all the parties to the arbitration express a contrary in-
tention. The formulation of the rule demonstrates that the drafters
intended to have a judicial ruling on the merits become the ac-
cepted procedure in French arbitral practice when the award was
set aside.
It would be unusual for parties to have the foresight, the will-
ingness, and the mutual cooperation necessary during their negoti-
ations to insert a provision dealing with the possibility of a judicial
ruling that would take place in the distant future by means of the
recourse procedure. 25" A contrary intention could be expressed
during or at the end of the recours en annulation action itself.2 57
In most cases such an agreement would mean a return to the first
stage of the arbitral process. Given that at least one party could
hope for a more favorable judgment from the court, it is unlikely
254. See, e.g., Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 14.
255. Id.
256. Once the parties became aware of the substance of article 45, however, such stipu-
lations might become commonplace in arbitration agreements.
257. See Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 14.
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that all the parties would refuse to have the dispute settled by a
court ruling at this stage of the process. Thus, the probable ratio-
nale for such a provision needs to be explored.
First, given the grounds upon which an award may be set aside
under a recours en annulation action, it is unlikely that a court
decision on the merits would be dramatically different from the
conclusions reached by the arbitral tribunal. These grounds, in
large part, deal with procedural defects and not the misapplication
of substantive legal rules. In contrast, the violation of a procedural
public policy concern (for example, the fact that one party was not
afforded the opportunity to present his case fully) could impinge
quite substantially upon the merits. In all probability the violation
of fundamental procedural requirements in the arbitral proceeding
would be a rare and exceptional occurrence. In the more usual
case, a court is likely to confirm the substantive part of the arbitral
tribunal's award and thereby avoid infringing upon the parties'
original intention to have their disputes resolved through arbitra-
tion. That intention also probably would be upheld in the event
that only part of the award was set aside on a ground that some-
how touched upon the merits; the court simply would only revise
that part of the award that was annulled.
Second, the apparent objective of article 45 was to promote
efficiency and economy in adjudication. Although the award is set
aside, the parties still have the benefit of a final decision on the
matter without having to reconstitute or name another arbitral tri-
bunal. From the terms of the Decree, it is unclear whether the
court would have the parties relitigate the matter. One would as-
sume that the court would render its ruling on the basis of the
existing record and not require the parties to go through the proce-
dure of reintroducing evidence and restating their arguments.
Moreover, to limit any intrusion upon parties' intention to arbi-
trate, 58 the Decree confines the court's jurisdictional authority to
the terms of reference which were originally given to the arbitral
tribunal.5 9
In the event of a full relitigation, however, certain obvious
problems would surface. First, does the reference to the arbitral
tribunal's terms of reference also imply that the court will apply
the flexible arbitral procedure for which the parties may have orig-
258. See, e.g., Decree, supra note 12, art. 18, at 1239.
259. Id. art. 45, at 1240.
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inally bargained? Second, despite the delimitation of the court's
jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal's terms of reference, what guar-
antee do the parties have that the court will interpret the applica-
ble legal principles as would a group of specialized laymen? In
these circumstances, the rebuttable presumption of a merits ruling
by the court, protected by the requirement that it can be defeated
only by the contrary intention of all the parties, could lead to an
undisputable violation of the original intention of the parties to
arbitrate.
In the exceptional case in which the award is set aside upon a
ground which involves the evidence gathering process, the addi-
tional power afforded to the court to rule upon the merits could
amount to a de novo appeal against the award despite the parties'
specific waiver of their right to appeal (a prerequisite of the
recours en annulation action). In these circumstances the possibil-
ity of a merits ruling would have the practical effect of dismantling
the bifurcated means of recourse structure by eliminating the dis-
tinction between the recours en annulation (intended as a more
moderate remedy) and appeal (which involves more drastic judicial
action). Both means of recourse would lead to the same result, al-
though the recours en annulation requires that the award be set
aside before the case is given de novo consideration. Relitigation
and a merits ruling completely disregard the parties' original in-
tention to waive their right to judicial appeal and to resolve their
disputes through arbitration. Obviously, the application of such a
rule would benefit a party acting in bad faith and seeking to un-
dermine the initial recourse to arbitration.
In light of the manifestly liberal tenor of the other provisions
of the Decree, especially those providing for a limited form of judi-
cial intervention in the arbitral proceeding,260 it is difficult to read
article 45 as providing a substantive basis for judicial encroach-
ment into the arbitral process. It seems that the article is a poorly
drafted attempt to promote efficient litigation or even to dissuade
parties from using the recours en annulation as a purely dilatory
tactic. This, in conjunction with the French courts' generally
favorable attitude toward arbitration, leads to the conclusion that
the intended objective of article 45 must be to provide the parties
a final resolution of the dispute at this stage of the arbitral process.
Moreover, the possibility of relitigating the dispute originally sub-
260. Decree, supra note 12, arts. 4, 14, 16, 17, & 23 at 1238-1239.
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mitted to arbitration before a court of law and the concommitant
possibility of having a court ruling on the merits which might dif-
fer radically from the arbitral award would appear likely only in
the exceptional case in which there was a violation of a fundamen-
tal procedural safeguard affecting the merits.
These considerations, however, are not compelling enough to
silence the objections to article 45. While the same result was pos-
sible under the antecedent legislation, no one ever paid any atten-
tion to these provisions because the remedies were never invoked
and the courts never made use of their would-be power. When an
award was set aside, the parties were free to reinstitute arbitration
or take their unresolved grievances to the appropriate court of first
instance. Although costly and time-consuming, this procedure
maintained a necessary distance between the judicial and arbitral
processes and strengthened the legal effect given to the parties'
original intention to arbitrate. It also safeguarded the integrity of
the parties' initial decision to waive their right to de novo appeal.
In summary, the terse language of article 45 can lead logically
to the most unanticipated results, i.e., it provides the possibility
for fundamental divergence between what is desired and what is
actually done. Under the language of this article, once an award
has been set aside, on whatever ground that is provided for in the
recours en annulation, the court can engage in a full relitigation of
the dispute. The possibility of a merits ruling may violate the orig-
inal and continuing intention of at least one of the parties to resort
to arbitration and disregard the agreement to waive the right of
appeal. It allows a party to change its mind unilaterally about arbi-
tration and to thwart the effectiveness of the arbitral process with
the support of the law. In systemic terms, article 45 has the conse-
quence, in theory at least, of lessening the institutional indepen-
dence and autonomy of the arbitral process. Obviously, this provi-
sion stands in contradistinction to the other articles and needs to
be reconciled with the general intention of the Decree. As had been
the case under the antecedent legislation, the courts probably will
provide the necessary guidance on this problem. Given their gener-
ally favorable attitude toward arbitration, it can be predicted with
reasonable certainty that they will construe article 45 in a manner
which protects the institutional status and independence of
arbitration.
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5. Appeal Against a Decision Denying Enforceability
This section considers the remedies that are available against
a judicial decision denying an exequatur to an arbitral award. Pre-
viously, this issue had not been treated in the applicable legisla-
tion, although the courts had recognized that appeal was possible
when the enforcement order had been denied.26 1 The Decree pro-
vides that the decision denying an exequatur can be appealed es-
sentially upon the same grounds as those available under the two
principal means of recourse that can be invoked against an arbitral
award.2 2 The drafters, it seems, intended to lessen the difficulties
that could attend the appeal of an unreasoned judicial decision.
6. The Retention of Traditional Rules
The remaining articles under this section generally codify, al-
beit with some slight modifications, the traditional rules estab-
lished either by law, court interpretation, or actual arbitral prac-
tice. For example, under the new legislation, the two principal
means of recourse are to be brought before the cour d'appel in the
jurisdiction of which the award was rendered.263 Previously, while
the appeal of the award was brought before a cour d'appel,2" the
opposition en nullit6 was brought before the court which had
granted an exequatur, namely, the district court (the tribunal de
grande instance).26 5 This grouping of the means of recourse before
a single appellate jurisdiction promotes uniformity and simplicity.
The court's denial of an appeal action or of a recours en annula-
tion action amounts to a grant of an exequatur,266 expressly elimi-
nating the need for additional court action (a point not mentioned
in the antecedent legislation). In addition, an award can be granted
an exequatur even when the means of recourse actions have been
invoked. For example, if the arbitral tribunal has ordered that the
award be enforced provisionally, the presiding judge of the court
before which the means of recourse is brought can grant an exe-
quatur to the award. If this same judge accords provisional en-
261. See J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at N3. See also Judgment of December
4, 1963, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1964], D. Jur. 503 [1964], REV. ARB. 15, J.C.P. H [1964].
262. Decree, supra note 12, art. 38(2), at 1239; id. art. 49, at 1240.
263. Id. art. 46, at 1240.
264. Nou. C. PR. CIV. art. 1023 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
265. Id. art. 1028(7).
266. Decree, supra note 12, art. 50, at 1240.
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forcement to the award, that decision amounts to an exequatur.
These provisions have the effect of simplifying and expediting the
procedure applying after the award has been rendered and of giv-
ing greater jurisdictional authority to arbitral awards.267
The Decree also maintains the rule that opposition or pourvoi
en cassation cannot be invoked against arbitral awards.26 8 More-
over, it states that the recours en revision remedy is still available
against an award on the same grounds which apply to court judg-
ments;269 namely, (1) for fraud on the part of the party in whose
favor the award was rendered; (2) upon the discovery of important
evidence that was withheld by one of the parties; or (3) upon the
discovery that fraudulent evidence was used or that the testimony
of witnesses was fraudulent.27 0 This particular means of recourse
can be invoked only in fairly limited circumstances; specifically, by
the injured party if he was unable, through no fault of his own, to
make these claims before the decision had res judicata effect.
2 7 1
The recours en revision is infrequently used in ordinary procedural
matters, and probably will have even less importance in arbitral
practice. 2
Finally, the tierce opposition action remains available against
arbitral awards.27 3 This action is to be brought before the court
which would have had jurisdiction over the dispute had there been
no arbitration agreement. 7 4 The import of this article is clear ex-
cept for its reference to a provision of the Civil Procedure Code.27
According to that provision, the court hearing the principal action
has jurisdiction to hear the tierce opposition motion, provided it is
a higher court than the one which rendered the decision in the ac-
tion challenged by the incidental plea of tierce opposition. If it is a
court of equal degree, there must be no jurisdictional rule of a
strong public policy character which opposes that court's assump-
tion of jurisdiction.276
Although the direct relevance of this provision to the sub-
267. See Riotte, Decree Commentary, supra note 12, at 13.
268. Id. art. 41, at 1239.
269. Id. art. 51, at 1240.
270. Nou. C. PH. civ. art. 595 (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
271. Id. art. 595(6).
272. See text accompanying notes 224-31 supra.
273. Decree, supra note 12, art. 41(2), at 1239.
274. Id.
275. Nou. C. PR. civ. art. 588(1) (Dalloz 72d ed. 1979).
276. Id.
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stance of article 41(2) is not immediately apparent, it appears to
have the following meaning in this context: under ordinary circum-
stances, the tierce opposition action to an arbitral award is
brought by a third party as a principal action before the court
which would have had jurisdiction to hear the dispute had there
not been an arbitration agreement. That court, however, may not
have jurisdiction to hear the tierce opposition action if the latter is
brought as an incidental plea in a main action before another
court. The court hearing the main action has jurisdiction to hear
the tierce opposition motion if it is at least equal or superior in
degree to the tribunal which rendered the challenged award. In
matters involving arbitral awards, this is always the case.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
A. Assessment of the Means of Recourse Reforms
The Decree, in large measure, must have been enacted in re-
sponse to the continuing scholarly criticism of the means of re-
course procedure available against arbitral awards in French do-
mestic law.2 77 It cannot be said with equal certainty, however, that
the new means of recourse procedure is the Decree's sole innova-
tion, or even its principal contribution to the legislative reform of
the French procedural law on arbitration. After an examination of
the section dealing with the means of recourse, one wonders what
is so innovative or fundamental about the Decree provisions on
this matter. Undoubtedly, there is progress in the sense that,
rather than a disorganized and disparate choice of possible reme-
dies, the parties now have two basic alternatives; appeal or recours
en annulation. The entire framework is organized upon the par-
ties' exercise of their prerogative to waive their right to de novo
appeal of the award. In a recours en annulation action, the power
of the court to render a merits ruling on the dispute under certain
conditions is indeed a provision having radical implications. There
are serious questions as to whether this provision is in harmony
with the generally progressively-minded substance and spirit of the
Decree, and whether it is acceptable as it stands in the arbitration
context. The fact that a court's rejection of either of the two prin-
cipal means of recourse, amounts to the grants of an exequatur, of
course, is a welcomed addition to the procedural arbitration law.
277. See, e.g., 1 J. ROBERT, ARBITRAGE CIVIL El COMMERCIAL 228 (3d ed. 1961).
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That much is clear and new.
Although the means of recourse procedure may be easier to
understand, some of the would-be innovations still cling to the
mold established by the past legislation. While it is clearly estab-
lished that opposition and pourvoi en cassation never have and
still do not apply against arbitral awards, the Decree retains all the
other former means of recourse.278 For example, the recours en re-
vision and the tierce opposition actions, can still be invoked. In
addition, the Decree expressly provides that a decision denying ex-
equatur is subject to appeal. The opposition en nullitg action has
been abolished since the decision granting an exequatur cannot be
challenged by any means of recourse. This categorical statement,
however, is somewhat misleading. On the one hand, in the same
article stating that the decision granting an exequatur is not sub-
ject to recourse, the drafters quickly added that the two principal
means of recourse, although not exercised directly against that de-
cision, carry with them a challenge of it. 279 On the other hand,
many of the grounds upon which the opposition en nullit6 could
be invoked have been incorporated into the grounds for bringing
the recours en annulation.280 What can be seen as a structural dif-
ference in the procedure does not, therefore, amount to a change in
substance.
In the final analysis, it may be quite impossible, in the light of
certain systemic considerations, to hope for a more simplified
means of recourse procedure than the one elaborated in the De-
cree. The key consideration appears to lie in the fact that, in the
French system, an appeal (specifically, l'appel en reformation) in-
volves the de novo consideration of the facts and the law with the
additional possibility of introducing new evidence. 281 This proce-
dure is clearly incompatible with the concept of arbitration under
which the parties intend to remove the resolution of their disputes
from the jurisdiction of the courts.282 While the willingness to
elaborate flexible regulations for arbitration has led the drafters to
leave open the possibility of appeal, the competing consideration of
attenuating the effects of the appeal procedure has also encouraged
278. Le., the opposition en nullit.
279. Decree, supra note 12, art. 48(2), at 1240.
280. Id. art. 44, at 1240.
281. See P. HERzoG, supra note 11, at 530.
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them to state the rule in terms of an option.28 3 In strictly systemic
terms, the law could not categorically deny the parties to an arbi-
tration their right to de novo appeal. One is tempted, however, to
argue that the elimination of that form of appeal would have been
the simplest, most effective, and most broad-minded reform of the
means of recourse.
The provision for appeal and the fact that it is often waived
leave two competing considerations unresolved. First, what means
of recourse can be invoked in order to provide relief to a party
whose interests were allegedly injured by an arbitral award? Sec-
ond, will this relief at the same time allow the courts to have some
sort of basic supervisory control over arbitral awards when the
right of appeal has been waived? The answer to this dilemma
comes in the form of the recours en annulation, with its procedu-
ral and fundamental public policy grounds for having arbitral
awards set aside. The other means of recourse are only of ancillary
importance and are designed primarily to respond to exceptional
circumstances which give rise to a ground for challenging an award.
These factors constitute at least a partial explanation for the need
in the French system for the bifurcated means of recourse proce-
dure against arbitral awards. Nonetheless, the restructuring of the
means of recourse does not necessarily constitute the chief advance
of the new legislation.
B. The Principal Innovation: Judicial and Arbitral
Cooperation
Unquestionably, the repealed provisions needed to be over-
hauled and replaced by provisions which reflected the jurispruden-
tial advances in this area and the realities of arbitral practice. In
this writer's opinion, the fundamental contribution of the Decree
of May 14, 1980, is not to be seen in any one particular provision
or title, but rather in its general tenor and in the basic legislative
attitude that it reflects toward arbitration. The Decree achieves a
remarkably intelligent balance between the recognition that it af-
fords to the contractual nature of arbitration and the uncompro-
mising exigency that all forms of justice (i.e., any dispute resolu-
tion process be it private or public in character) sometimes need
the coercive sanction of public authority in order to function effec-
tively. The provisions relating to the possibility of judicial inter-
283. J. ROBERT & B. MOREAU, supra note 5, at Q1.
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vention in the arbitral proceedings represent a delicate orchestra-
tion of competing needs that results from the fruitful collaboration
between the courts and arbitral tribunals. "Judicial facilitation"
rather than "judicial intervention," more accurately describes the
process in which the arbitral process retains its near-complete au-
tonomy and ultimately achieves its fundamental purpose.
C. A Global Assessment
The new legislation should be hailed as an undeniably creative
achievement, filling gaps, resolving longstanding doctrinal debates,
and innovating changes. The French procedural law on arbitration
as it relates to fundamental matters and key issues now is a matter
of public knowledge and available to interested parties in a clear,
well-organized, and comprehensive form. The jurisdictional effects
of an arbitration agreement are officially recognized," 4 and the ar-
bitrators have increased jurisdictional powers.28 5 In general, the ar-
bitral proceeding follows the fundamental procedural principles
contained in the Nouveau Code de procedure civile, a factor which
also provides a much needed degree of clarity.
In light of some of the sweeping changes that were intro-
duced,28 6 it is somewhat regrettable that the drafters did not ven-
ture down the path of introducing expressly the separability doc-
trine into the substance of the Decree.28 7 That innovation, it
seems, remains a thing of the future, perhaps to be decided by
courts following the implied suggestions of the Decree.
In the last analysis, the Decree of May 14, 1980, is a landmark
of progressively-minded legislation which confirms one's thinking
that arbitration is regarded as an important institution in French
legal and commercial practices. Furthermore, in light of the sophis-
tication and favorable tenor of the applicable procedural law, it es-
tablishes France as a particularly hospitable jurisdiction in which
to hold arbitral proceedings.
284. Decree, supra note 12, art. 18, at 1239.
285. Id. art. 26, at 1239.
286. Id. arts. 20, 25, 27, 35, 39, & 41, at 1239 (this list only refers to the explicit refer-
ences in the Decree to the civil procedure code; other articles, e.g., arts. 29-32, nevertheless
borrow from the provisions of that code without any explicit cross-reference).
287. See text accompanying notes 117-134 supra.
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